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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the greatest jurists of our time, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
described what he meant by the law as “[t]he prophecies of what the
courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious . . . .”2 Attorneys
1
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Law. J.D., Washburn University School of Law, 1987; M.P.A., University of Kansas,
1982; B.G.S., University of Kansas, 1977. I am grateful to my colleagues Ellen Byers,
Peter Cotorceanu, Ron Griffin, David Pierce, Sheila Reynolds, Bill Rich, and Jim Wadley
for their encouragement; to Washburn University School of Law for research support;
and to Stefanie Benson, my research assistant, and Roarke Gordon, my teaching assistant,
without whose help this article would not have been possible.
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Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1887).
[T]he command of the public force is intrusted to the judges in certain
cases, and the whole power of the state will be put forth, if necessary, to
carry out their judgments and decrees. People want to know under what
circumstances and how far they will run the risk of coming against what is
so much stronger than themselves, and hence it becomes a business to find
out when this danger is to be feared. The object of our study, then is
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who practice before the federal courts of appeals are in the business of
predicting what the courts will “do in fact” by analyzing cases decided in
the past—cases that make up the body of law, both binding and
3
persuasive, known as “precedent.” American jurisprudence is rooted in
the doctrine of stare decisis, by which attorneys render reasoned
prophecies about future court decisions by analyzing opinions from days
4
gone by.
prediction, the prediction of the incidence of the public force through the
instrumentality of the courts.
Id. at 457. In his essay, Holmes articulated what is now known as the “predictive theory
of law.” See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1216 (8th ed. 2004); see also LLEWELLYN, infra
note 3, at 82.
3
See KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 5-6 (Michael
Ansaldi. trans., Paul Gewirtz ed., 1989).
It is almost a sociological necessity . . . for a precedent system of some sort
to arise in situations where the legislature has given no directives (or when
those directives are overtaken by changing circumstances and the conflicts
they engender). Judges must be economical with their energies. They all
find it hard to decide difficult cases. It is much easier to follow an earlier
decision. Also, a wise judge is held in high regard. His decisions linger in
the mind, and other judges feel compelled to give a like judgment in a like
case. Besides this, there is that remarkable, widespread basic sense of justice
which requires that like cases be treated alike. Be that as it may, the upshot
is that, at a minimum, some kind of precedential law must arise once there
are professional judges and written records, and then add to that professional
lawyers, and then the modern industrial state. Precedent systems, though,
can be rigid or relaxed, fixed or fluctuating, regulated or unregulated. . . . In
any event, this process was substantially furthered by the introduction of
written pleadings in the 16th century—soon followed by a requirement that
the specific point at issue be unalterably set before trial. Once this happened,
a court’s opinions could be read with reference to definite fact situations,
thereby making the scope of precedent ascertainable with greater precision
than before. Toward the end of the sixteenth century the system of
“Reporters”—that is, printed collections of holdings and opinions—also
began to take on great significance. . . . Even so, it was not until the close of
the eighteenth century that the now-orthodox theory of truly binding
precedent began to be worked out and regulated by appellate review.
Id. For one definition of “precedent,” see infra note 189.
4
LLEWELLYN, supra note 3, at 81-82.
[Lawyers] play a game of chance, in which the deciding factor is the
relevant court’s degree of insight into the new facts. For a lawyer to
acknowledge this means attaining a far greater measure of legal certainty.
For now he will adjust his predictions, his interpretations of prior decisions,
and his arguments to accord with a theory that corresponds to fact rather
than one that floats in thin air. This is true not only of litigation but also of
advising clients about to enter into legal transactions. To the extent he can
predict the insight a judge will have, a lawyer will be able to foresee that
certain conceivable results will probably, in actual fact, not ensue. He
fruitfully marries a knowledge of decision making’s “normative” side to the
insights acquired from legal sociology and thereby attains a higher level of
predictability. One must recall over and over that legal certainty is part of
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Ironically, at this juncture of the twenty-first century, some
eighty percent5 of the decisions issued each year by the thirteen federal
courts of appeals are designated as “unpublished” or “nonprecedential.”6
Notwithstanding the traditional role of stare decisis in the development
of American common law,7 most of the United States Courts of Appeals
at least discourage, if not outright prohibit, the citation of “unpublished”
or “nonprecedential” written opinions in appellate briefs and oral

the world of “What Is,” not the world of “What Ought to Be,” and that
sociological factors are therefore particularly relevant.
Id. (citations omitted).
5
Table 1.6, U.S. Courts of Appeals - Type of Opinion or Order Filed in Cases
Terminated on the Merits After Oral Hearing or Submission on Briefs [hereinafter Table
1.6], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judicialfactsfigures/table1.06.pdf (last visited
Feb. 27, 2005). In the fiscal year ending September 30, 2003, the federal courts of
appeals, excluding the Federal Circuit, terminated 27,009 cases, of which 79.9 percent
were designated as unpublished. Id.; Table S-3, U.S. Courts of Appeals - Types of
Opinions or Orders Filed in Cases Terminated on the Merits After Oral Hearings or
Submissions on Briefs During the 12-Month Period Ending September 30, 2003
[hereinafter Table S-3], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2003/tables/s3.pdf
(last visited Feb. 27, 2005). The national average masks a range as low as 9.2 percent for
the First Circuit to a high of 91.2 percent for the Fourth Circuit. Id. By comparison, the
percentage of unpublished decisions issued by the federal circuits in fiscal year 1989 was
64.7. See Table 1.6, supra. The percentage topped out at 80.5 percent in fiscal year 2002.
Since 2000, the overall annual percentage has hovered within a half percentage point of
80 percent. Id.
6
“Unpublished” does not mean what it purports to mean. See, e.g., William R.
Mills, The Shape of the Universe: The Impact of Unpublished Opinions on the Process of
Legal Research, 46 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 429, 432 (2002-03) (noting that “vast numbers
of what lawyers call ‘unpublished opinions’ are not really unpublished at all”). In fact,
“unpublished” means whatever the issuing court so designating an opinion wants it to
mean. For example, shortly after West initiated publication of the Federal Appendix in
September 2001, the First Circuit redefined the term as follows:
A published opinion is one that appears in the ordinary West Federal
Reporter series (not including West’s Federal Appendix) or as a recent
opinion intended to be so published. All slip opinions released by the clerk’s
office are intended to be so published unless they bear the legend “Not For
Publication” or some comparable phraseology.
1ST CIR. R. 36(b)(2)(F) (emphasis added) (interim amendment effective Sept. 24, 2001),
available at http://www.bostonbar.org/pw/bbaweek/v4i5_100101.htm (last visited March
30, 2005); see 8TH CIR. R. 28A(i) (“Unpublished opinions are decisions which a court
designates for unpublished status.”); Stephen R. Barnett, From Anastasoff to Hart to
West’s Federal Appendix: The Ground Shifts Under No-Citation Rules, 4 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 1, 3 & n.10 (2002) (citing and discussing First Circuit’s interim rule); see also
infra note 24 (quoting LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 186 (Penguin
Books ed. 1998)).
7
See Richard B. Cappali, The Common Law’s Case Against Non-Precedential
Opinions, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 755, 761 (2003) (“To label [opinions] nonprecedential is to
deprive them of stare decisis effects.”); Mills, supra note 6, at 432 (“The rules restricting
citation of unpublished opinions are intended as enforcement mechanisms for negating
their precedential value.”).
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arguments.8 Four circuits have restrictive rules that strictly prohibit the
citation of “unpublished” opinions, except in “related cases” for
purposes such as res judicata, collateral estoppel, double jeopardy, or law
of the case.9 Three circuits have nonrestrictive rules that neither prohibit
nor discourage litigants from citing “unpublished” opinions in briefs or
11
oral argument.10 The other six circuits have adopted rules including
12
“discouraging words,” which expressly disfavor citation of unpublished
opinions except in related cases and otherwise only when “no published
13
opinion . . . would serve as well.”
At the same time, federal circuit courts expect attorneys
appearing before them to comply with the ethical duty of candor, as
expressed in ethical standards, procedural rules, and substantive law. As
8

See Appendix I (table summarizing current publication and citation rules for each
federal circuit). Some circuits flatly prohibit citation of opinions designated as
“unpublished” or “nonprecedential.” Others expressly disfavor their citation, yet permit
them to be cited for their persuasive authority if no precedential opinion serves as well.
Id. For comparable summary information concerning citation rules and practices in the
federal circuits in 1985, see Donna Stienstra, Unpublished Dispositions: Problems of
Access and Use in the Courts of Appeals 60-65, Tables 8 & 9 (Federal Judicial Center
1985), available at 1985 WL 71560.
9
The Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Federal Circuits are deemed to have restrictive
citation policies, also known as “no-citation” rules. See Stienstra, supra note 8, at 26,
Table 1 & n.2 (“A circuit’s citation policy is defined as restrictive if citation is permitted
only in related cases or to support a claim of res judicata or collateral estoppel, or the law
of the case.”) In 1985, seven circuits maintained restrictive policies, including these four
plus the First, Eighth, and District of Columbia Circuits. Id. at Table 1.
10
The Third, Fifth, and District of Columbia Circuits are deemed to have
nonrestrictive citation policies. See id. at 26 n.2 (“Circuits that allow citation if the
unpublished case is relevant or if no better precedent is available are not considered to
have a restrictive citation policy.”) The Fifth Circuit does not consider unpublished
opinions issued on or after January 1, 1996 to be precedential, but they may be freely
cited for their persuasive value. 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. Unpublished opinions issued before
January 1, 1996 are deemed to be precedential, but the court discourages their citation
except in related cases. See 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.3. The District of Columbia Circuit has
abandoned its previously restrictive policy, but only for opinions issued on or after
January 1, 2002. See D.C. CIR. R. 28(c)(1)(B).
11
The First, Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits disfavor citation of
unpublished opinions, but permit their citation if no published opinion would serve as
well.
12
See Stephen R. Barnett, No-Citation Rules Under Siege: A Battlefield Report and
Analysis, 5 J. PRAC. & PROCESS 473 (2003) (“Although nine of the thirteen circuits now
allow citation of their unpublished opinions, all nine discourage the practice; they all
have language in their rules stating that such citation is ‘disfavored’. . . .”); id. at 497
(defending rules discouraging but permitting citation of unpublished opinions); see also
Minutes of April 13-14, 2004, Meeting of Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules,
Washington, D.C., at 10-11, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/
app0404.pdf (discussing and rejecting Professor Barnett’s suggested amendment to
proposed FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 that would allow local rules “discouraging,” but not
outright prohibiting, citation of nonprecedential opinions).
13
E.g., 4TH CIR. R. 36(c).
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officers of the court, attorneys are expected to engage in professional
conduct that protects and defends the integrity of the judicial system,
even if that means compromising their ethical duties as advocates for
14
their clients.
This article explores the inherent conflict between federal circuit
rules prohibiting or discouraging citation of “unpublished” opinions, on
the one hand, and the universally acknowledged standards of
professional conduct requiring attorneys to fully research and disclose
relevant legal authority, on the other. The premise of the article is that
nonuniform circuit rules restricting attorneys from citing the great
majority of federal appellate opinions undermine the integrity of our
judicial system by greatly diminishing the predictability of circuit court
decisions. The resulting uncertainty is one significant cause of the
15
increasing proliferation of federal appeals, which negates (and arguably
outweighs) any benefits that may have accrued since no-citation rules
were originally proposed and adopted during the 1970s.
What this article does not address, except by way of background, is
whether restrictive citation rules are unconstitutional. Nor, for that
matter, does the article address whether a federal appellate court should
assign precedential or persuasive value to its unpublished opinions.

14

See infra notes 94-101 and accompanying text.
See Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, Structure,
and Internal Procedures, Recommendations for Change, 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975).
The studies of the Commission show four major consequences of the failure
of the federal judicial system to provide adequate capacity for the
declaration of national law. In a very real sense, however, each of the four is
but a different facet of the same phenomenon: unnecessary and undesirable
uncertainty. For the judge, uncertainty is the lack of a body of precedents
adequate for confident decision; for the practitioner, it is a lack of stability
sufficient to provide predictability adequate for effective service to clients
and society. Some uncertainty is, of course, inevitable. No lawyer steeped
in the tradition of case-by-case development of the law, or sensitive to the
inevitable problems of applying even a settled rule to a given fact situation,
would pursue the chimera of certainty as an absolute. Moreover, we would
not, [even] if we could, accept certainty at the price of stifling new wisdom
and needed change. Yet, to recognize the inevitability of some uncertainty
does not require that subordination of clarity and stability which results in
wasteful proliferation of litigation and threatens public as well as private
interests. A prudent balance must be struck.
Id. at 217; see also 1 WILLIAM CRANCH, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES iii (Frederick C. Brightly, ed., 3d ed. 1911)
(“Whatever tends to render the laws certain, equally tends to limit [judicial] discretion;
and perhaps, nothing conduces more to that object than the publication of reports . . . .”),
quoted in Howard Slavitt, Selling the Integrity of The System of Precedent: Selective
Publication, Depublication, and Vacatur, 30 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 109, 109 & n.1
(1995).
15
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These critically important issues are well beyond the scope of this article
and must wait until another day.
Others have addressed the constitutional arguments against “nocitation” rules raised by Judge Richard Arnold16 in Anastasoff v. United
States,17 which held that the Eighth Circuit’s local rule restricting the
citation of unpublished decisions as precedent exceeded the limited
18
powers conferred by Article III of the United States Constitution. A
number of observers have criticized Judge Arnold’s reasoning, but still
others have acknowledged additional constitutional implications, notably
19
20
with respect to the Due Process Clause and the First Amendment.
The principal opponents in the debate have been the legal academy on
the one hand21 and several federal circuit judges22 on the other.
16

Judge Arnold did not live to see the outcome of the constitutional debate. He died
on September 23, 2004, from complications related to medical treatment for lymphoma.
On October 16, 2004, he was posthumously awarded the Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Award for
Professionalism and Ethics by the American Inns of Court. He had been selected to
receive the 2004 award earlier in the year, before his untimely death. The award was
presented at the annual American Inns of Court Celebration of Excellence. See Judge
Richard Arnold to receive the 2004 American Inns of Court Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Award,
at http://www.innsofcourt.org/contentViewer.asp?breadCrumb=6,123,125,1366 (last
visited Feb. 27, 2005).
17
223 F.3d 898, vacated as moot on reh’g, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
18
Id. at 905.
19
See, e.g., Mark D. Hinderks & Steve A. Leben, Restoring the Common in the Law:
A Proposal for the Elimination of Rules Prohibiting the Citation of Unpublished
Decisions in Kansas and the Tenth Circuit, 31 WASHBURN L.J. 155, 215, 217 (1992)
(observing that the due process argument rests upon the right to fair trials and fair
tribunals); Melissa H. Weresh, The Unpublished, Non-Precedential Decision: An
Uncomfortable Legality?, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS, 175, 193-95 (2001)
(acknowledging that citation restrictions present legitimate due process issues); Lance A.
Wade, Note, Honda Meets Anastasoff: The Procedural Due Process Argument Against
Rules Prohibiting Citation to Unpublished Judicial Decisions, 42 B.C. L. Rev. 695, 722,
731 (2001) (concluding that federal circuit courts’ no-citation rules violate procedural
due process); Jon A. Strongman, Comment, Unpublished Opinions, Precedent, and the
Fifth Amendment: Why Denying Unpublished Opinions Precedential Value is
Unconstitutional, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 195, 223 (2001) (concluding that limited
publication rules violate the Fifth Amendment’s due process and equal protection
guarantees).
20
See, e.g., David Greenwald & Frederick A.O. Schwartz, Jr., The Censorial
Judiciary, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1133, 1161-66 (2002); Mark D. Hinderks & Steve A.
Leben, supra note 19, at 215-17; Christopher J. Peters, Adjudicative Speech and the First
Amendment, 51 UCLA L. REV. 705, 780-83 (2004); Marla Brooke Tusk, Note, NoCitation Rules as a Prior Restraint on Attorney Speech, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1202, 122730 (2003).
21
See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 12; Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of
Appeals Perish if They Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of Opinions to Explain and
Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 757 (1995);
Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in the U.S.
Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435 (2004). Some federal circuit judges have sided with the
legal academy in support of efforts to reform no-citation rules. See, e.g., Richard S.
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Scholarly discourse has also addressed the pros and cons of “no-citation”
rules for the development of a consistent body of substantive law or
“precedent” that applies with equal force to all litigants within each
circuit.23
The article concludes that rules restricting citation of opinions
issued by the federal courts of appeals are an anachronism. The reasons
originally cited in justification of no-citation rules have long since
become moot with the astounding technological innovations of the last
two decades. Moreover, their continued existence and threatened
enforcement by the federal circuits contradict longstanding norms and
values governing attorneys’ professional conduct. When local rules
purport to restrict attorneys from citing unpublished opinions, they must
yield to the conflicting duty of candor imposed by standards of ethical
conduct, rules of procedure, and substantive law. The attorney’s duty of
candor to the court and the duty to uphold the integrity of the judicial

Arnold, The Federal Courts: Causes of Discontent, 56 S.M.U. L. REV. 767, 777-80
(2003); Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 219 (1999); Testimony of Judge Edward R. Becker, Transcript of 2004
Advisory Committee Hearing, infra note 68, at 246-47 (supporting proposed FED. R. APP.
P. 32.1); Letter from Judge Frank H. Easterbrook, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, to
Peter G. McCabe, Secretary, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Feb. 13,
2004) (supporting proposed FED. R. APP. P. 32.1), available at http://www.
secretjustice.org/pdf_files/Comments/03-AP-367.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
22
See, e.g., Alex Kozinski, In Opposition to Proposed Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1, 51 FED. LAW. 36, 42 (June 2004) (“Because unpublished dispositions
tend to be thin on the facts, and written in loose, sloppy language . . . they will create a
veritable amusement park for lawyers fond of playing games.”); Boyce F. Martin, Jr., In
Defense of Unpublished Opinions, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 177, 193 (1999) (“adamantly”
opposing citation of unpublished opinions); Philip Nichols, Jr., Selective Publication of
Opinions: One Judge’s View, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 909, 914 (1986) (“[H]ard as it may be
for academia to believe, the nonprecedent is really not a precedent, and the rule [limiting
citation of unpublished opinions] works as intended.”); see also Martha Dragich Pearson,
Citation of Unpublished Opinions as Precedent, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1235, 1296-97 (2004).
Broadly speaking, federal appellate judges commenting on the proposed
[R]ule [32.1] doubt the need for a uniform rule, forecast greater use of
summary dispositions if the rule is adopted, differentiate unpublished
opinions from other non-binding sources that may be cited, and vigorously
dispute the proposition that citation can be divorced from precedential
status.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
23
See Pearson, supra note 22, at 1306 (“The courts of appeals should permit the
citation of all opinions, abbreviated or otherwise, for whatever they may be worth in the
“free market” of precedents.”); Leane C. Medford, Bruce H. White & William L.
Medford, The Continuing Controversy over the Precedential Effect of Unpublished
Opinions, 20 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26, 27 (Nov. 2001) (predicting that the controversy is
likely to continue until the United States Supreme Court puts it to rest). See generally
Jason B. Binimow, Annotation, Precedential Effect of Unpublished Opinions, 105 A.L.R.
5TH 499 (2003 & Supp. 2005) (collecting cases and other legal authorities).
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system outweigh the duty to comply with local circuit rules barring
citation of “unpublished” legal authority.
No-citation rules artificially impose fictional status on
24
unpublished opinions, contrary to the overarching ethical duty, shared
by attorneys and judges alike, to protect the integrity of the American
judicial system. To pretend that no-citation rules can be reconciled with
norms of professional conduct and rules of ethics is to defend a surreal
25
netherworld that imposes an outmoded and unjustified double bind on
the federal bar.
24

“Publish,” as defined by BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1268 (8th ed. 2004), means
“[t]o distribute copies (of a work) to the public.” As many others have noted, the term
“unpublished” is a misnomer – a legal fiction – because copies of all judicial opinions,
unless sealed by the court, are distributed to the public to a greater or lesser degree. See,
e.g., Amy E. Sloan, A Government of Laws and Not Men: Prohibiting Non-Precedential
Opinions by Statute or Procedural Rule, 79 IND. L.J. 711, 711 n.2 (2004) (concluding
that the term “unpublished” is a misnomer). Some courts even provide access to
“unpublished” opinions by subscription service. Even that method of access is no longer
required as of December 17, 2004, when every federal circuit will be required to provide
the public internet access to all its written opinions, whether designated for “publication”
or not. See infra notes 257-62 and accompanying text.
The fiction of definitions is aptly illustrated by this passage from a familiar
children’s book:
“I don’t know what you mean by ‘glory,’” Alice said [to Humpty
Dumpty].
Humpty Dumpty smiled contemptuously. “Of course you don’t—till I
tell you. I meant ‘there’s a nice knock-down argument for you’!”
“But ‘glory’ doesn’t mean ‘a nice knock-down argument,’” Alice
objected.
“When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said, in a rather scornful tone, “it
means just what I choose it to mean, neither more nor less.”
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean so
many different things.”
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master - that’s
all.” Alice was too much puzzled to say anything; so after a minute Humpty
Dumpty began again.
“They’ve a temper, some of them - particularly verbs: they’re the
proudest - adjectives you can do anything with, but not verbs - however, I
can manage the whole lot of them! Impenetrability! That’s what I say!”
“Would you tell me, please,” said Alice, “what that means?”
“Now you talk like a reasonable child,” said Humpty Dumpty, looking
very much pleased. “I meant by ‘impenetrability’ that we’ve had enough of
that subject, and it would be just as well if you’d mention what you mean to
do next, as I suppose you don’t mean to stop here all the rest of your life.”
“That’s a great deal to make one word mean,” Alice said in a thoughtful
tone.
“When I make a word do a lot of work like that,” said Humpty Dumpty,
“I always pay it extra.”
“Oh!” said Alice. She was too much puzzled to make any other remark.
Lewis Carroll, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 186 (Penguin Books ed. 1998).
25
The more I think about the comments on Rule 32.1, the more I am struck by how
strange the current system is. Unpublished opinions are the crazy uncle in the attic of the
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II. THE SAGA OF “UNPUBLISHED” OPINIONS:
KNOWING THE LAW OF THE LAND
In the late 1700s, nearly a century before Holmes described his
understanding of the law in terms of pragmatic prophecies, Jeremy
Bentham challenged a contemporary jurist’s representation that “[e]very
man has the means of knowing all the laws he is bound by.”26 Bentham
both asked and answered the following rhetorical question, using
language characteristic of the late eighteenth century, yet sounding a
familiar note in the early twenty-first:
What way, then, has any man of coming at this [common
law]? Only by watching [court] proceedings: by observing in
what cases they have hanged a man, in what cases they have sent
him to jail, in what cases they have seized his goods, and so
forth. These proceedings [the judges] won’t publish themselves,
and if anybody else publishes them, it is what they call a
contempt of court, and a man may be sent to jail for it.27

....
Counsellors, who have nothing better to do, watch these cases
as well as they can, and set them down in their note-books, to
make a trade of them; . . . . Some of them, to drive a penny, run
the risk of being sent to jail, and publish their notebooks which
they call reports. But this is as it happens, and a judge hears a
case out of one of these report-books, or says it is good for
nothing, and forbids it to be spoken of, as he pleases.

federal judiciary, and no-citation rules are the whispered instructions to party guests not
to hurt the hosts’ feelings by mentioning that uncle. Memorandum from Patrick J. Schiltz
to Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, Re: Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure Published for Comment in August 2003, at 97 (March 18, 2004),
available at http://www.nonpublication.com/schiltz.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
“[U]npublished opinions have become the blind spot, the Bermuda Triangle of
jurisprudence, the Twilight Zone where the Constitution ceases to exist, because the
unpublished case is assumed to be comparatively unimportant, and is calculated to be the
least likely to obtain Supreme Court review.” Letter to The Honorable Howard Coble,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, from
Jonathan Lewin, Norfolk, Virginia (July 8, 2002) (urging legislation to remove “the
shield of secrecy from unlawful judicial opinions” by allowing appellants to compel
publication of decisions in their own cases), reprinted in Unpublished Judicial Opinions:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 2d Sess., at 305-06 (2002), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/80454.PDF (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
26
Jeremy Bentham, Truth versus Ashhurst; or, Law As It Is, Contrasted With What It
Is Said to Be (1792), reprinted in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 235 (1843) (citing
BURROWS’ REPORTS, preface).
27
Id. (citing BURROWS’ REPORTS, preface).
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How should plain men know what is the law, when judges
cannot tell what it is themselves?28

....
Obey it we must: but, to obey it, must we not know it? And
shall they whose business it is to make and obey it, be suffered to
keep it from us any longer?29

As Bentham and Holmes both acknowledged so long ago, the
manner in which cases are actually decided best reflects the law in the
practical sense of the word, not what judges declare the law to be in a
sanitized minority of decisions selectively reported as “precedential.”30
For judge-made law to have any practical value for actual or potential
31
litigants, it must be made known to them; as a matter of jurisprudence,

28

Id.
Id. at 236.
30
See, e.g., Cappali, supra note 7, at 768 (noting that “the true content of law”
involving diverse factual settings “is known not by the verbal rule formulations but by the
application of those verbal formulations to specific settings.”); id. at 775 (stating that
nonprecedent rules reverse the maxim that what a court does, not what it says,
exemplifies the law); see also Letter from Stephen R. Barnett to The Honorable Samuel
A. Alito, Jr., Further Comments of Stephen R. Barnett On Proposed Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 32.1 In Reply to Judge Kozinski, at 4 (Feb. 17, 2004) [hereinafter
Further Comments of Stephen R. Barnett], available at http://www.nonpublication.com/
barnettresponse321.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2005). “[L]aw is not what judges say, but
what they decide.” Id. (emphasis in original).
The maxim that what a court does exemplifies the law rather than what it says is
attributed to the legal realism movement, “which pierces theory and bald axioms and
exposes how judges actually behave.” Cappali, supra note 7, at 775 (citing Danny J.
Boggs & Brian P. Brooks, Unpublished Opinions & the Nature of Precedent, 4 THE
GREEN BAG: AN ENTERTAINING J. OF L. 17, 17 (2000)). Indeed, Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Jr. has been credited with heavily influencing the American legal realist movement, and
The Path of the Law has been called his most important contribution to the “seedbed.”
See EVA H. HANKS ET AL., ELEMENTS OF LAW 512 (1994); see also supra note 2 and
accompanying text (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV.
L. REV. 457, 461 (1887)).
31
David Greenwald & Frederick A.O. Schwartz, Jr., The Censorial Judiciary, 35
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1133, 1156-57 (2002).
Reasoned written opinions enable people to learn what the law is and to
act in accordance with it. Reasoned written opinions also help resolve future
disputes by providing precedents for decisions. . . . Those purposes—the
derivation of the efficiencies that come from public reliance on precedent
and from citation thereto—fully justify the production of written opinions at
public expense.
Those purposes, however, are obviously thwarted when the opinion
cannot be cited. In such instances, members of the public cannot reasonably
rely upon the opinion as a guide for future conduct, nor can judges consider
it as a guide for decision in later cases. . . . [N]oncitable opinions [are utterly
29

2005]

LEGAL FICTION OF THE UNPUBLISHED KIND

37

what the courts have done in the past must shape the ratio decidendii for
32
resolving contemporary disputes.
Contrary to the doctrine of stare decisis, nearly all federal courts of
appeals maintain explicit rules governing the issuance and citation of
“unpublished” or “nonprecedential” opinions.33 Adopted in the 1970s at
the behest of the United States Judicial Conference,34 circuit court rules
distinguishing “published” from “unpublished” opinions have generated
35
considerable controversy from the very beginning.
The practice
originated in response to the dramatic caseload increases in the late
1960s and early 1970s, prompting administrative measures in an effort to
stem the tide of new opinions in keeping with the number of circuit
judgeships then authorized by Congress.
In 1972, the Judicial Conference36 urged each circuit to adopt a
“publication plan” for managing its caseload.37 The publication plans
worthless] to the public at large. Taxpayers are well within their rights to
ask why they are paying for them.
Id.

32

See Further Comments of Stephen R. Barnett, supra note 30, at 4. “As we all
learned in the first weeks of law school, what judges say is only ‘dictum’; such words are
to be distinguished from the ‘holding’ of a case, or the ratio decidendi, which alone is the
law that is made.” Id.
33
See Appendix I (table summarizing current publication and citation rules for each
federal circuit).
34
Stienstra, supra note 8, at 7 & n.13 (citing Reports of the Proceedings of the
Judicial Conference of the United States (October 1972)).
35
“Of the recent innovations, none has been more controversial than the practice of
disposing of some cases without a published decision, a practice that has been adopted to
some extent by all federal appellate courts.” Id. at 2.
36
The Judicial Conference was initially established by Congress in 1922 as the
Conference of Senior Circuit Judges to “serve as the principal policy making body
concerned with the administration of the United States Courts.” Judicial Conference of
the United States, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judconf.html (last visited Feb.
24, 2005). The name was changed to the Judicial Conference of the United States in
1948. Id.; see 28 U.S.C.A. § 331 (2005). Among other things, Congress has charged the
Judicial Conference to “carry on a continuous study of the operation and effect of the
general rules of practice and procedure now or hereafter in use as prescribed by the
Supreme Court for the other courts of the United States pursuant to law.” 28 U.S.C.A. §
331 (2005).
37
Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
to the Chief Justice of the United States and Members of the Judicial Conference of the
United States 8 (September 2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/jc092004/JCReport.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005). In 1971, the Federal Judicial Center
established the Advisory Council on Appellate Justice, whose members were lawyers,
law professors, and judges. The Council began a study of appellate processes, and in
1973 it published its report, Standards for Publication of Judicial Opinions: A Report of
the Committee on Use of Appellate Court Energies of the Advisory Council on Appellate
Justice (Federal Judicial Center 1973). The report “has been described as the ‘seminal
document in the movement toward an official policy of limiting publication.’” Stienstra,
supra note 8, at 7 & nn.14-15 (quoting Daniel N. Hoffman, Nonpublication of Federal
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developed by the circuits over the next two years included rules
governing citation of unpublished decisions; many of those provisions
38
differed among the circuits. At the time they were adopted, the wellmeaning intention of “no-citation rules” was to avoid the perceived
unfairness if well-financed institutional and corporate litigants were
permitted to amass a large bank of unpublished opinions “not designated
39
for publication.”
The perceived problem was that opinions “not
designated for publication,” if citable, would operate to the disadvantage
of infrequent litigants who might not have a feasible means of indexing
40
and retrieving unpublished opinions.
Thus, by the mid-1970s, nearly all circuits41 had adopted explicit
rules providing for written decisions to be designated either “for
publication” or “not for publication.” Generally, the rules authorized the
issuing panel or the judge authoring the opinion to decide whether a
42
particular opinion should be published or unpublished, and some
circuits adopted guidelines for judges to apply in making the
43
determination.
Typically accompanying each circuit’s plan for
Appellate Court Opinions, 6 JUST. SYS. J. 405 (1981)). Among other recommendations,
Standards for Publication of Judicial Opinions proposed four standards for determining
whether to publish an opinion, as well as a model rule prohibiting citation of unpublished
opinions. Stienstra, supra note 8, at 7-8. The proposed rule stated, “Opinions marked, Not
Designated for Publication, shall not be cited as precedent by any court or in any brief or
other material presented to the court.” Id. at 8 n.19 (quoting Standards for Publication of
Judicial Opinions: A Report of the Committee on Use of Appellate Court Energies of the
Advisory Council on Appellate Justice 23 (Federal Judicial Center 1973).
38
Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
to the Chief Justice of the United States and Members of the Judicial Conference of the
United States 8 (September 2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/jc092004/JCReport.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
39
Stienstra, supra note 8, at 8, 10 (noting concerns that attorneys with “abundant
resources” or those appearing routinely before the appellate court (such as the U.S.
Attorney’s Office) would have an unfair advantage if permitted to cite unpublished
opinions).
40
See, e.g., Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure to the Chief Justice of the United States and Members of the Judicial
Conference of the United States 12 (September 2004) (“No-citation rules may have been
necessary to level the playing field in years past when access to unpublished opinions
was limited to large firms or institutional entities . . . .”), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/jc09-2004/JCReport.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
41
The exception was the Third Circuit.
42
See, e.g., 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.2 (stating that an “opinion shall be published unless
each member of the panel deciding the case determines that its publication is neither
required nor justified under the criteria for publication.”); 6TH CIR. R. 206(b) (“An
opinion or order shall be designated for publication upon the request of any member of
the panel.”).
43
See, e.g., 6TH CIR. R. 206(a) (addressing seven criteria to be considered by panels
determining whether to designate an opinion for publication); 7TH CIR. R. 53(c)
(providing that an opinion will be published if any one of six independent criteria is met).
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managing the issuance of its opinions were stringent rules prohibiting
appellate counsel, whether in briefs or oral argument, from citing
opinions “not designated for publication.”44
In the meantime, computer-assisted legal research was in its
infancy.
In 1973, just one year after the Judicial Conference
recommended adoption of circuit publication plans, Lexis began offering
electronic access to its legal research database; Westlaw followed suit
soon after in 1975.45 Over time, most “unpublished decisions” became
increasingly accessible to attorneys who could afford to subscribe to one
of the proprietary computer research services. Other specialized
publishers of legal research materials also selectively disseminated
46
unofficial reports of “unpublished” opinions for their subscribers.
Thus, the pragmatic limitations the courts had initially imposed on the
public availability of “unpublished” paper opinions gradually lost hold in
favor of the commercial publishers.
In September 2001, just as the online availability of unpublished
opinions became nearly ubiquitous, West Publishing Company initiated
production of a new reporter service. The Federal Appendix publishes
federal circuit court opinions designated by the issuing court as
“unpublished” or “nonprecedential.”47 Initially, all federal courts of
appeals except the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits granted West
permission to reprint their “unpublished” opinions in bound volumes.48
44
See, e.g., 9TH CIR. R. 36-3(b) (providing that unpublished dispositions and orders
“may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit” except under specified
circumstances). See generally Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure to the Chief Justice of the United States and Members of the
Judicial Conference of the United States 7-9 (September 2004), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/jc09-2004/JCReport.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005);
William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent—Limited
Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L.
REV. 1167, 1168-72 (1978) (reviewing the history of limited publication/no-citation
plans).
45
Lawrence Duncan MacLachlan, Gandy Dancers on the Web: How the Internet Has
Raised the Bar on Lawyers’ Professional Responsibility to Research and Know the Law,
13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 607, 621 (2000).
46
See, e.g., George M. Weaver, The Precedential Value of Unpublished Judicial
Opinions, 39 MERCER L. REV. 477, 479 (1988) (noting that specialized services
unofficially publish opinions not designated for publication); see also, THE BLUEBOOK: A
UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION R. 19, at 147 (Columbia Law Review Ass’n et al. eds.,
17th ed. 2000). “Cases . . . are often published unofficially in topical compilations called
‘services,’ which appear in looseleaf form initially and sometimes are published later as
bound volumes.” Id.; see id. at 343-48 (listing numerous frequently cited services).
47
Brian P. Brooks, Publishing Unpublished Opinions: A Review of the Federal
Appendix, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 259, 259 (2002); see also Barnett, supra note 6, at 2-3 &
nn.6-9.
48
Brooks, supra note 47, at 260; Mills, supra note 6, at 444 (noting West’s stated
policy to publish every “unpublished” opinion sent to publishers, omitting cases so
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Not long after, the Third Circuit announced that its opinions would be
made available to legal publishers for dissemination effective January 2,
2002.49 In the four years since West initiated publication of the Federal
Appendix, more than 117 volumes have been issued.
Thus began the controversy that, thirty years later, continues to
generate heated commentary and debate among the judiciary, the
50
academic community, and the federal bar. Since the mid-1970s, circuit
opinions “not designated for publication” have proliferated.51 Litigants
began to challenge nonpublication and no-citation rules almost
immediately after they were adopted.52 In 1975, the final report of the
53
Hruska Commission discussed the controversy and “fundamental
problems” associated with no-citation policies, and suggested further
54
study by the Judicial Conference.
As early as 1985, the Federal
Judicial Center,55 noting the increasing problems associated with
abbreviated as to preclude “a synopsis and at least one headnote”). Decisions published in
the Federal Appendix are also available on Westlaw and Lexis.
49
Barnett, supra note 6, at 3 & n.12 (quoting Third Circuit’s press releases dated
Dec. 5, 2001 and Feb. 21, 2002).
50
See generally Memorandum from Patrick J. Schiltz to Advisory Committee on
Appellate Rules, Re: Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
Published for Comment in August 2003, at 36-91 (March 18, 2004), available at
http://www.nonpublication.com/schiltz.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005) (summarizing
public comments in response to proposed FED. R. APP. P. 32.1).
51
See Table 1.6, supra note 5 (illustrating increase in unpublished opinions issued
annually by all federal circuits, from 12,394 in 1989 to 21,557 in 2003).
52
See, e.g., Browder v. Dir., Dep’t of Corr., 434 U.S. 257, 258 n.1 (1978)
(acknowledging, but not reaching, petitioner’s challenge to “the [constitutional] validity
of the Seventh Circuit’s ‘unpublished opinion’ rule”).
53
In 1972, Congress established the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court
Appellate System, Structure and Internal Procedures (commonly known as the Hruska
Commission) to study problems concerning the federal appellate courts. The Commission
held public hearings across the country in 1974-75, at which judges, attorneys, and law
professors presented their concerns regarding the federal circuits’ limited publication
plans and restrictive citation rules. See generally HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION ON
REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, SECOND PHASE (Vols. I & II,
1974-75), cited in Stienstra, supra note 8, at 9 n.21.
54
Stienstra, supra note 8, at 9-12 (citing Commission on Revision of the Federal
Court Appellate System, Structure and Internal Procedures: Recommendations for
Change 51 (1975)).
55
The Federal Judicial Center was established in 1967 to “further the development
and adoption of improved judicial administration in the courts of the United States.” 28
U.S.C.A. § 620(a) (2005). The Center is the arm of the federal judicial system devoted to
research and education. Among its other specific statutory duties, the Center is directed to
make recommendations about the operation and study of the federal courts, and to
conduct and promote research on federal judicial procedures and court operations. 28
U.S.C.A. § 620(b)(1)-(2) (2005). By law, the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme
Court chairs the Center’s Board. Its members also include the Director of the
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and seven judges (including two circuit judges)
elected by the Judicial Conference. 28 U.S.C.A. § 621(a)(1)-(3) (2005).
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unpublished opinions, engaged in a comprehensive study of the practice
and its effects on litigants.56 In 1995, the American Bar Association
issued a formal ethics opinion concluding that the citation of an
unpublished opinion in disregard of a court’s no-citation rule would
57
amount to a violation of the ethical rules.
With the advent of the internet in the mid-1990s, commentators in
the academic community predicted that technological innovation would
undermine the original justifications for limiting citation of unpublished
decisions.58 In late 2001, the American Bar Association adopted a
resolution declaring that the practice of prohibiting the citation of
unpublished opinions is “contrary to the best interests of the public and
the legal profession,” and urged federal courts of appeals to permit
56

See Stienstra, supra note 8.
Rule 3.4(c) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct reads as follows:
A lawyer shall not:
....
(c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for
an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists[.]
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(c) (2002).
A formal ethics opinion initially issued in 1994 and later revised and clarified in 1995
addressed the issue as follows:
Where, then, a court’s rule of procedure contains a specific prohibition
against citing an unpublished opinion, a lawyer who does so in that forum
violates Rule 3.4.
In a jurisdiction which has a prohibiting rule a lawyer might ask
permission of the court to cite an unpublished case. However, until such
permission has been expressly granted, the lawyer should scrupulously
refrain from presenting the unpublished decision to that court.
On the other hand, there is no violation if a lawyer cites an unpublished
opinion from another jurisdiction in a jurisdiction that does not have such a
ban, even if the opinion itself has been stamped by the issuing court “Not
For Publication,” so long as the lawyer informs the court to which the
opinion is cited that that limitation has been placed on the opinion by the
issuing court. Court rules prohibiting the citation of unpublished opinions,
like other procedural rules, may be presumed, absent explicit indication to
the contrary, to be intended to govern proceedings in the jurisdiction where
they are issued, and not those in other jurisdictions. Thus, the Committee
does not believe that a lawyer’s citing such an opinion in a jurisdiction other
than the one in which it was issued would violate Rule 3.4(c).
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-386R (1995).
58
See, e.g., Kirt Shuldberg, Comment, Digital Influence: Technology and
Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 541, 544
(1997) (“The digital availability of information directly impacts both what it means for an
opinion to be “unpublished” and the rationale supporting the content of existing limited
publication plans.”); cf. Robert Berring, Chaos, Cyberspace and Tradition: Legal
Information Transmogrified, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 189, 199 (1997) (“The tectonic
plates of legal information are shifting.”); MacLachlan, supra note 45, at 647 (urging
courts to accept responsibility to the legal system and to the public by holding lawyers
accountable to a standard of competence in legal research “reflective of the reality of
readily accessible information”).
57
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citation to “relevant unpublished opinions.”59 Even Congress got
involved. On June 27, 2002, the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet,
and Intellectual Property of the United States House Judiciary
Committee held an “oversight hearing” on unpublished opinions.60
The following May, the Judicial Conference’s Advisory Committee
on Appellate Rules approved a proposed addition to the Federal Rules of
61
Appellate Procedure addressing the citation of unpublished opinions.
62
The new rule was published for comment in August 2003:
The Committee proposed to add a new Rule 32.1 that would
require courts to permit the citation of judicial opinions, orders,
judgments, or other written dispositions that have been
designated as “unpublished,” “non-precedential,” or the like.
New Rule 32.1 would also require parties who cite “unpublished”
or “non-precedential” opinions that are not available in a publicly
accessible electronic database (such as Westlaw) to provide
63
copies of those opinions to the court and to the other parties.

59
ABA Resolution 01A115 (August 1, 2001), available at http://www.abanet.org/
crimjust/policy/cjpol.html (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
RESOLVED, THAT the American Bar Association opposes the practice of
various federal courts of appeal in prohibiting citation to or reliance upon
their unpublished opinions as contrary to the best interests of the public and
the legal profession.
FURTHER RESOLVED, THAT the American Bar Association urges the
federal courts of appeals uniformly to:
(1) Take all necessary steps to make their unpublished decisions available
through print or electronic publications, publicly accessible media sites, CDROMs, and/or Internet Websites; and
(2) Permit citation to relevant unpublished opinions.
Id.
60
Unpublished Judicial Opinions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong., 2d
Sess., at 305-06 (2002) [hereinafter Unpublished Judicial Opinions], available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/legacy/80454.PDF (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
61
See Memorandum to Judge Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure, from Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory
Committee on Appellate Rules (May 22, 2003), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/Reports/AP5-2003.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005) (reporting action by advisory
committee approving three proposed amendments to Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure).
62
Minutes of April 13-14, 2004, Meeting of Advisory Committee on Appellate
Rules, Washington, D.C., at 1, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/
app0404.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005); see Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure Submitted for Public Comment: A
Summary for Bench and Bar (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts August 2003),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/summary0803.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
63
Memorandum from Patrick J. Schiltz, Reporter, to Advisory Committee on
Appellate Rules, Re: Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
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The proposed new rule generated a paper war of public
64
comments. By January 2004, however, when the Judicial Conference
65
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure initially discussed the
Advisory Committee’s proposal, several members expressed their
66
support.
Some participants observed that the traditional distinction
between “published” and “unpublished” opinions was “no longer
67
meaningful.”
The comment period culminated in a public hearing on this and
68
other proposed rules in Washington, D.C., on April 13, 2004. Nearly
all the testimony presented that day focused on proposed Fed. R. App. P.
Published for Comment in August 2003, at 4 (March 18, 2004), available at
http://www.nonpublication.com/schiltz.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
64
The public comment period ended on February 16, 2004. Id. at 1. Of the more than
500 public comments the Advisory Committee received addressing several proposed
changes to the Rules of Appellate Procedure, more than 95 percent related solely to Rule
32.1. Id.; see also Minutes of January 15-16, 2004 Meeting, Judicial Conference
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Phoenix, Arizona, at 9-10, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/jan2004.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005) (noting
that the rule had attracted a good deal of opposition including a letter-writing campaign,
with the vast majority coming from the Ninth Circuit; however, bar groups offered
considerable support and encouragement for the rule).
65
The Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure is
commonly known as the “Standing Committee.”
66
Minutes of January 15-16, 2004 Meeting, Judicial Conference Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure, Phoenix, Arizona, at 10, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/Minutes/jan2004.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
67
Id.
There was a clear consensus among the participants that unpublished
opinions are very useful and that the committee should take no position on
whether unpublished opinions should be given precedent [sic]. Several
participants argued that many cases do not break new ground or raise
serious legal issues. They simply do not merit the attention of a careful,
precedential opinion. In fact, they said, the courts of appeals could not
function effectively if they were bound by unpublished or non-precedential
opinions. The proposed rule, they said, merely permits attorneys to cite
these opinions for whatever weight they are worth.
One member cautioned, however, that allowing attorneys to cite
unpublished opinions could increase the burdens on lawyers in light of their
professional responsibilities to be aware of the decisions of the court and to
represent their clients vigorously.
Id.; see Minutes of April 13-14, 2004, Meeting of Advisory Committee on Appellate
Rules, Washington, D.C., available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/
app0404.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005). Committee Reporter Patrick J. Schlitz,
summarizing the January meeting, reported that “in the course of an hour-long
discussion, several members of the Standing Committee, as well as several of the
advisory committee chairs and reporters, spoke in support of new Rule 32.1 [and] [n]o
one expressed opposition . . . .” Id. at 1-2.
68
See Transcript of Testimony, Public Hearing Before Advisory Committee on
Appellate Rules, Administrative Offices of the U.S. Courts, April 13, 2004, at 224
[hereinafter cited as Transcript of 2004 Advisory Committee Hearing], available at
http://www.nonpublication.com/aphearing.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
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The hearing
32.1, the most controversial of the proposed rules.
70
testimony was mixed. However, at the Advisory Committee meeting
69

See Minutes of April 13-14, 2004, Meeting of Advisory Committee on Appellate
Rules, Washington, D.C., at 7, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/
app0404.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005). See generally Transcript of 2004 Advisory
Committee Hearing, supra note 68.
70
See generally Transcript of 2004 Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 68. In
one of the more colorful colloquies during the hearing, Judge Becker was questioned by
Mr. Sandford Svetcov, a practicing attorney from the Ninth Circuit and a member of the
Advisory Committee:
JUDGE BECKER: I have always operated under the 11th commandment,
that thou shalt not let the tail wag the dog, and it strikes me that if the Ninth
Circuit is our caliper, the tail’s wagging the dog. At some point something’s
going to happen to the Ninth Circuit. . . . [A]t some point my guess is the
Ninth Circuit’s going to be divided in some way and maybe the problem
will take care of itself.
MR. SVETCOV: I’ve testified . . . before the White Commission in favor of
some divisional accommodation within the Ninth Circuit, . . . but the fact of
the matter is splitting the Ninth Circuit will still leave, unless California is
split—
JUDGE BECKER: Oh, I’m for that, too.
MR. SVETCOV: You know, that’s something whose time has not come,
Judge Becker, and I submit to you the same is true with Rule 32.1 and
nothing further needs to be—
JUDGE BECKER: My point, Mr. Svetcov, is if what they [have] given you
[in an unpublished opinion] isn’t worth anything, then you don’t cite it.
That’s all. I mean the issue here is not the quality of their work product but
the question of whether it’s citable. If they’ve given you two paragraphs that
are incomprehensible, then Sanford Svetcov, good lawyer that he is, isn’t
going to bother citing it. And the lawyers who are not of the Sanford
Svetcov caliber, and they do cite it, it’s going to take Alex Kozinski—I
don’t know the difference between a microsecond or a nanosecond but it’ll
be that fast to toss it aside. So I don’t see the burden.
MR. SVETCOV: Well, put yourself in my office. Do I read the 777
opinions that are published [by the Ninth Circuit] and also the 4,000 or
5,000 that are not?
JUDGE BECKER: The answer is neither you nor anybody else reads the
700 that were published. When I started sitting with the Third Circuit 30
years ago . . . we had an audience at that time. The courts of appeals had an
audience. We don’t have an audience anymore. The bar is so huge, it is so
specialized, it is so fractured that no [one any] longer reads all the opinions.
You read the opinions that are in your area and nobody in their right mind’s
going to read the 7,000 or however many there are nonprecedential or
unpublished opinions, but you’ve got research tools which will identify if
it’s of any value to you.
It strikes me, Mr. Svetcov, that this is an in terrorem argument that in the
real—I mean I’m not qualified to talk about the economics of law practice;
I’ve been out of it for over 33 years, but my sense is that in terms of the
economics of law practice, you’re not going to invest a lot of time and a lot
of your clients’ money in that enterprise.
MR. SVETCOV: I don’t. That’s the point. But if I’m facing my opponents
citing to them on a regular basis because the floodgates are opened up to
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immediately following the hearing, all but one of the seven members
71
present spoke in support of the proposed new rule. As later reported to
72
the Judicial Conference, “The advisory committee rejected claims that
adoption of rules permitting citation would result in dire consequences.
Courts that have permitted citation of unpublished opinions simply have
73
not experienced any serious adverse consequences.” After discussion,
74
the Advisory Committee voted to recommend Rule 32.1 favorably.
that stuff and I don’t find the same level of talent on both sides of the case,
then I’m faced with having to deal with—
JUDGE BECKER: Then the question is whether your opponent’s got a
brain or half a brain. If he’s got half a brain and he’s citing garbage, then
you don’t worry about it. If it’s stuff that doesn’t amount to a hill of beans
you’re not going to spend any time on it. But if he cites an opinion, a sevenor eight-page opinion which is thoughtful, well then you’d damned well
better deal with it because the court’s going to look at it. So what else is
new? So what’s wrong with that?
MR. SVETCOV: Well, as I said, if it’s thoughtful you can adopt that
reasoning and make it part of your case without citing to the—
JUDGE BECKER: Well, I heard—
MR. SVETCOV: Judges may or may not have signed off [on the reasoning
of written opinions not designated for publication]—
JUDGE BECKER: I heard that. I find that argument underwhelming, to
paraphrase the old Four Roses ad, Mr. Svetcov.
MR. SVETCOV: I’ve underwhelmed a lot of judges in my time.
Testimony of Judge Edward R. Becker, Transcript of 2004 Advisory Committee Hearing,
supra note 68, at 249-53.
71
Minutes of April 13-14, 2004, Meeting of Advisory Committee on Appellate
Rules, Washington, D.C., at 7, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/
app0404.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005). Most of the members agreed that whatever
problems unpublished opinions may cause, local rules that “gag attorneys” are not the
proper way to deal with the issue. Id. at 8.
72
See Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure to the Chief Justice of the United States and Members of the Judicial
Conference of the United States 10 (September 2004), available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/rules/jc09-2004/JCReport.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
73
Id.
74
See Minutes of April 13-14, 2004, Meeting of Advisory Committee on Appellate
Rules, Washington, D.C., at 9, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/Minutes/app0404.pdf (last visited Feb.27, 2005) (noting one dissent and one
absence). The Advisory Committee also amended the rule to remove one clause that was
deemed unnecessary. Id. at 12. Other amendments were discussed, but not approved. Id.
at 9-11. One would have made the new rule operate prospectively only, id. at 9, and
another would have permitted local circuit rules disfavoring or discouraging citation of
unpublished opinions. Id. at 10. Although the Advisory Committee opposed both
amendments, which would have narrowed the scope of the new rule, the members agreed
that if either the Standing Committee or the full Judicial Conference failed to approve
Rule 32.1 as they had currently drafted it, the Advisory Committee would consider the
possibility of recommending a more limited version of the rule in lieu of none at all. Id. at
11.
The text of the proposed new rule, with the amendment adopted by the Committee
shown in striketype, reads as follows:
Rule 32.1. Citation of Judicial Dispositions
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The Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, more commonly known as the Standing Committee, met on
June 17-18, 2004, to consider the Advisory Committee’s proposed new
75
After discussion, the Standing Committee voted to return
rules.
proposed Rule 32.1 to the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules for
76
further study. In a lengthy report to the Chief Justice and the Judicial
Conference in September 2004, the Standing Committee carefully
documented the previous expressions of concern by the Judicial
Conference regarding the nonuniformity of no-citation rules among the
77
circuits.
In addition, the report acknowledged the Conference’s
(a) Citation Permitted. No prohibition or restriction may be imposed upon
the citation of judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written
dispositions that have been designated as “unpublished,” “not for
publication,” “non-precedential,” “not precedent,” or the like, unless that
prohibition or restriction is generally imposed upon the citation of
all judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions.
(b) Copies Required. A party who cites a judicial opinion, order, judgment,
or other written disposition that is not available in a publicly accessible
electronic database must file and serve a copy of that opinion, order,
judgment, or other written disposition with the brief or other paper in which
it is cited.
Id. at 2-3; see id. at 12.
75
See Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure to the Chief Justice of the United States and Members of the Judicial
Conference of the United States 1 (September 2004), available at http://www.
uscourts.gov/rules/jc09-2004/JCReport.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
76
Id. at 13.
Several courts of appeals have expressed concerns with some aspects of the
proposed rule. These concerns are mainly centered on the belief that
permitting citation of nonprecedential opinions will significantly increase
the workload of the courts. In response to that increase, these courts predict
that time to disposition will increase as will the number of summary
judgment [sic] orders. These concerns can be tested empirically in the nine
circuits that now permit citation. In an effort to reach a greater consensus
among the courts, and in deference to the circuits that oppose the proposed
rule, the Committee [on Rules of Practice and Procedure] decided to defer
approving the proposed new rule in favor of such an empirical study. The
Committee concluded that some further consideration by the advisory
committee would be helpful once the empirical study was completed. This
further consideration would take into account the results of the empirical
study but need not be limited to empirical issues. The Committee was
particularly interested in the advisory committee’s further consideration of
the application of the proposed rule to state court unpublished opinions. The
Committee was careful to state that its action was neutral and should not be
understood to express disapproval of the proposal.
Id.; see also Pearson, supra note 22, at 1296 n.532.
77
Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
to the Chief Justice of the United States and Members of the Judicial Conference of the
United States 8-9 (September 2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/jc092004/JCReport.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005). “The [A]dvisory [C]ommittee [on
Appellate Rules] concluded that the promulgation of uniform citation rules was timely,
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predisposition favoring uniform procedures regarding citation of
unpublished opinions, as expressed in 1995 when it recommended that
“‘the relevant committees of the Judicial Conference should work
together to develop a uniform set of procedures and mechanisms for
access to circuit court opinions, guidelines for publication or distribution,
78
and clear standards for citation.”
The most recent and perhaps most significant development in the
continuing saga of “unpublished” opinions is the E-Government Act of
79
2002.
Section 205(a)(5) of the Act expressly requires all federal
circuits to provide electronic access, no later than December 17, 2004, to
“all written opinions,” whether designated for publication or not.80
Therefore, at least prospectively, Congress has spoken, trumping any
remaining practical distinction between “unpublished” and “published”
opinions issued by the federal courts of appeals.81
III. THE ETHICAL DILEMMA OF “UNPUBLISHED” OPINIONS:
TO CITE OR NOT TO CITE?
No uniform code of professional conduct governs practice in the
federal court system.82 The federal courts have not been able to develop
consistent with the views of the Committee on Court Administration in 1972, the Judicial
Conference in 1974, the Federal Courts Study Committee in 1992, and the Judicial
Conference again in 1995, which had urged that uniform citation standards be
prescribed.” Id. at 10-11.
78
Id. at 8-9 (quoting Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts 70 (December 1995))
(emphasis added by Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure).
79
See id. at 9. “The E-Government Act of 2002 requires all federal courts to post all
opinions, including ‘unpublished’ opinions, on the court web site.” Id.
80
E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205(f), 116 Stat. 2899, 2915
(2002). The Act provides that not later than two years after the Dec. 17, 2002 effective
date of Title II, §§ 201-216, 116 Stat. 2910, the websites required by section 205(a) must
be established. Each website must contain certain information or links to websites
providing the information, specifically including:
(5) Access to the substance of all written opinions issued by the court,
regardless of whether such opinions are to be published in the official court
reporter, in a text searchable format.
(Emphasis added.) In addition, the Act requires that all written opinions issued after the
effective date of section 205 must remain available online. See Pub. L. No. 107-347, §
205(b)(2), 116 Stat. 2899, 2914.
81
“In an ironic counterpoint to court rules that draw a sharp distinction between
published and unpublished opinions, the spread of computerized legal research has meant
that ‘unpublished’ opinions generally are as readily available as those designated as
‘published.’” Unpublished Judicial Opinions, supra note 60, at 44 (prepared statement of
Arthur D. Hellman).
82
Judith A. McMorrow, The (F)Utility of Rules: Regulating Attorney Conduct in
Federal Court Practice, Research Paper No. 44, at 5 (September 29, 2004 draft),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=597862 (last visited Feb. 27, 2005); see also
STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND
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the necessary consensus to adopt a uniform code of ethics for the federal
83
bar; nor have they uniformly incorporated the ethical rules of the
respective states in which the federal courts sit.84 Attorneys who practice
in many federal jurisdictions, including Department of Justice attorneys,
have expressed concern about inconsistencies in the enforcement of
ethical rules and the imposition of sanctions.85
The federal courts draw on several sources to regulate litigation
ethics.86 While nearly all federal circuits have adopted or incorporated
codes governing the conduct of litigants,87 ethical rules of conduct
adopted by attorneys’ licensing jurisdictions or by the tribunals in which
they practice are not the only means of regulating attorney conduct.88
The federal courts also draw on procedural rules, norms of practice, and
STANDARDS 587 (2005) (although seriously considered in the 1990s, federal courts have
not adopted Federal Rules of Professional Conduct).
83
See Minutes of January 15-16, 2004 Meeting, Judicial Conference Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure, Phoenix, Arizona, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/Minutes/jan2004.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
[T]he committee’s extensive efforts in considering potential attorney
conduct rules have been placed on indefinite hold. . . . [H]owever, . . . the
committee [will] be ready to respond quickly if Congress were to enact
legislation calling for the judiciary to initiate attorney conduct rules and if
the Department of Justice, the Conference of Chief Justices, and the
American Bar Association were to agree on the substance of the proposed
rules.
Id. at 20. For a collection of materials reflecting the extensive work devoted to the
subject, see Daniel R. Coquillette & Marie Leary, Administrative Office of the United
States Courts, Working Papers of the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure:
Special Studies of Federal Rules Governing Attorney Conduct (1997), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/WorkingPapers-AttorneyConduct.pdf (last visited Feb. 27,
2005).
84
McMorrow, supra note 82, at 6. The Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure (generally known as the Standing Committee) appointed an ad
hoc task force in 1998 to formally study a proposal to adopt a core set of ten uniform
rules of professional conduct, which would have applied in federal district courts and
courts of appeals. Minutes of June 18-19 Meeting, Judicial Conference Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure, Santa Fe, New Mexico, at 41-42, available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/june1998.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005); see
Professional Responsibility Standards, Rules & Statutes 683-93 (John S. Dzienkowski
abr. ed., West 2000-01) (reprinting draft federal rules of attorney conduct). Proposed
Rule 7 would have adopted MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 virtually in its
entirety. See id. at 690. The note accompanying the proposed rule explained the need for
the rule as follows: “To preserve the integrity of the court proceedings, candor toward the
tribunal is a matter of significant federal interest, and as such, requires a single uniform
standard applicable in all federal courts.” Id. (citing Roger C. Cramton, Memorandum to
Participants of the Special Study Conference 2-3 (Jan. 8, 1996)).
85
McMorrow, supra note 82, at 6-7.
86
Id. at 7.
87
See Appendix II (table summarizing each federal circuit’s attorney disciplinary
codes).
88
McMorrow, supra note 82, at 5 n.13.
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formal ethical codes.89 While ethical rules impose a kind of “strict
liability” for their breach,90 attorney conduct is also governed by
applicable procedural rules and substantive law.91 In addition, the
federal courts have the inherent power to regulate the conduct of
attorneys and litigants who participate in proceedings before them.92
Because of the lack of uniformity in the approach to regulating attorney
conduct, the practicing bar faces the challenging task of anticipating how
any particular federal court will respond to an ethical dilemma.93
In particular, lawyers have an ethical duty of candor to the court.94
Among other things, the duty of candor prohibits attorneys from
89

Id. at 7.
L. RAY PATTERSON, LAWYER’S LAW: PROCEDURAL, MALPRACTICE AND
DISCIPLINARY ISSUES 17 (4th ed. 1999).
91
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 42 cmt. a (2000). A lawyer
who engages in misconduct while representing a client is subject not only to professional
discipline, but also to civil liability and criminal prosecution. Id.; see MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(b) & cmt. 2 (2002) (while a lawyer is “personally answerable to
the entire criminal law,” professional accountability rests only on offenses that suggest
“lack of those characteristics relevant to law practice[,]” such as dishonesty or breach of
trust).
92
See In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634, 643-44 (1985) (reversing Eighth Circuit’s
suspension of a lawyer for six months for “contemptuous or contumacious conduct”).
Courts have long recognized an inherent authority to suspend or disbar
lawyers. This inherent power derives from the lawyer’s role as an officer of
the court which granted admission. The standard for disciplining attorneys
practicing before the courts of appeals is set forth in Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 46:
“(b) Suspension or Disbarment. When it is shown to the court
that any member of its bar has been suspended or disbarred
from practice in any other court of record, or has been guilty of
conduct unbecoming a member of the bar of the court, he will
be subject to suspension or disbarment by the court. . . . .”
The phrase “conduct unbecoming a member of the bar” must be read in light
of the “complex code of behavior” to which attorneys are subject.
Essentially, this reflects the burdens inherent in the attorney’s dual
obligations to clients and to the system of justice.
Id. (emphasis added by the court) (internal citations and footnotes omitted); see also
McMorrow, supra note 82, at 7. “[I]n practice the rules of professional conduct function
like standards, serving to guide the federal courts but not unduly constrain their
decisionmaking.” Id. at 8.
93
McMorrow, supra note 82, at 9.
94
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a) (2002); see also supra note 84
(discussing Proposed Federal Rule of Professional Conduct 7). The following passage
from a nineteenth century text illustrates that the duty of candor has deep roots in
American legal ethics.
There is no profession in which moral character is so soon fixed as in that of
the law; there is none in which it is subjected to severer scrutiny by the
public. It is well that it is so. The things we hold dearest on earth,—our
fortunes, reputations, domestic peace, the future of those dearest to us, nay,
our liberty and life itself, we confide to the integrity of our legal counsellors
and advocates. Their character must be not only without a stain, but without
90
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knowingly making a false statement of law to the court, or from failing to
correct a false statement of material law that the attorney has previously
made to the court.95 Moreover, the duty of candor requires an attorney to
disclose authority in the controlling jurisdiction that the attorney knows
is directly adverse to the position taken on the client’s behalf.96
Recognizing the possible conflict between the attorney’s duty of candor
to the court and the duty of loyalty to the client, the rule expressly
provides that the duty of candor applies, even if it means disclosing
information otherwise protected by the ethical duty to maintain
confidentiality of client information.97 To qualify as a violation, an
affirmative misrepresentation of the law is not required. Under some
circumstances, the failure to make a disclosure is considered the ethical
equivalent of an affirmative misrepresentation.98
In addition to the ethical code provisions addressing the lawyer’s
duty as an advocate, a separate ethical rule explicitly defines professional
misconduct to include “engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation . . . .”99 Rule 8.4 addresses the broad
duty of an attorney to maintain the integrity of the profession, and it also
prohibits “conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice . . .
suspicion. From the very commencement of a lawyer’s career, let him
cultivate, above all things, truth, simplicity, and candor: they are the
cardinal virtues of a lawyer. Let him always seek to have a clear
understanding of his object: be sure it is honest and right, and then march
directly to it. The covert, indirect, and insidious way of doing anything, is
always the wrong way. It gradually hardens the moral faculties, renders
obtuse the perception of right and wrong in human actions, weighs
everything in the balances of worldly policy, and ends most generally, in the
practical adoption of the vile maxim, “that the end sanctifies the means.”
GEORGE SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 169-70 (4th ed. 1876).
95
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(1) (2002).
96
Id. 3.3(a)(2); see, e.g., In re Hendrix, 986 F.2d 195, 200-01 (7th Cir. 1993)
(Posner, J.) (acknowledging circuit division on whether failure to acknowledge binding
adverse precedent violates FED. R. CIV. P. 11, but if “counsel knowingly concealed
dispositive adverse authority[,] it engaged in professional misconduct” contrary to
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (1983) [now MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(2) (2002)].
97
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(c) (2002) (citing MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2002)). See generally Angela Gilmore, Self-Inflicted Wounds:
The Duty to Disclose Damaging Legal Authority, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 303 (1995).
When a lawyer finds herself caught in a bind over clashing allegiances owed
to court and client, the scales must tilt toward the court. Times where the
lawyer’s duty owed to the court trumps loyalty to the client range far and
wide. On the most obvious level, an attorney may never be a party to
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
Id. at 312-13 (internal citations omitted).
98
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 3 (2002).
99
Id. 8.4(c).
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.”100 Acknowledging the potential for conflicting ethical and legal
obligations, the commentary provides:
A lawyer may refuse to comply with an obligation imposed by
law upon a good faith belief that no valid obligation exists. The
provisions of Rule 1.2(d) concerning a good faith challenge to
the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law apply to
challenges of legal regulation of the practice of law.101

For the express purpose of ensuring fairness to the opposing party
and counsel, the Model Rules also prohibit an attorney from “knowingly
disobey[ing] an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for an
open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists . . . .”102
The Model Rules provide no commentary directly pertaining to this
subsection. However, a formal ethics advisory opinion issued by the
American Bar Association in 1994, later revised in 1995, expressly relied
103
on this ethical rule.
The opinion concluded that the citation of
unpublished dispositions amounted to a breach of Rule 3.4(c), but only if
the jurisdiction had adopted a specific rule prohibiting citation of such
opinions:104
It is ethically improper for a lawyer to cite to a court an
unpublished opinion of that court or of another court where the
forum court has a specific rule prohibiting any reference in briefs
to an opinion that has been marked, by the issuing court, “not for
publication.” On the other hand, there is no violation if a lawyer
cites an unpublished opinion from another jurisdiction in a
jurisdiction that does not have such a ban.105
100

Id. 8.4(d).
Id. 8.4 cmt. 4. Rule 1.2(d) provides that an attorney may not counsel a client to
engage in criminal or fraudulent conduct, but “may counsel or assist a client to make a
good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or application of the law.”
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2002).
102
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(c) (2002).
103
See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-386R (1995).
104
See id. A 1963 informal ethics advisory opinion had concluded that citation of
unreported opinions as such did not pose an ethical problem, even in a jurisdiction like
Tennessee, which at that time did not encourage the citation of such opinions except for
the value of their reasoning. See ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Informal Op. 667 (1963).
However, the informal opinion concluded with a caveat that there was nothing unethical
about citing to an unreported opinion in the absence of “specific court rules or the
customs or practice of the bar or of a particular court” to the contrary. Id. Interestingly,
Formal Opinion 94-386R did not cite the dictum in the 1963 informal opinion, even
though it directly supported the result reached in the 1995 opinion.
105
ABA Comm. On Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-386R (1995);
see also Cristi Ray, Comments and Current Developments, Recent Opinions from the
ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 1099, 1116 (1995) (reviewing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility,
101
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The opinion did not address the express possibility that an attorney
may openly refuse to comply with a court’s no-citation rule based on an
assertion that no valid obligation exists to comply with the local rule.106
Beyond the rules of ethics, an attorney must abide by laws
prohibiting fraud and misrepresentation, which apply to lawyers and
nonlawyers alike.107 Violations may occur not only in the form of
affirmative misrepresentations, but also failure to comply with
obligations to disclose.108 In fact, the ethical duty to disclose directly
adverse authority known to the attorney is just such an obligation.109 A
court could quite rightly conclude, for example, that an attorney’s failure
to cite pertinent legal authority, known to be directly contrary to the
client’s position, amounts to a deliberate misrepresentation of the law.110
Formal Op. 94-386 (1994)). The original advisory opinion issued in 1994 recognized that
the Sixth and Tenth Circuits had “recently suspended their bans against use of
unpublished opinions, partly because of the . . . electronic availability of the opinions.”
Id. at 1117-18 (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94386, at 2 (1994)). While attorneys in jurisdictions that had not lifted their bans might
request special permission to cite an unpublished opinion, they were cautioned to comply
with the relevant tribunal’s rule, “regardless of what the trend may be in the legal field
generally.” Id. at 1118. “[I]n those jurisdictions where the ban has not been suspended, a
lawyer violates Model Rule 3.4(c) by citing unpublished decisions, even if he believes
that the policy behind the prohibition has been called into question by the actions taken
by the Tenth Circuit and the Sixth Circuit.” Id. at 1118 n.80 (quoting ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-386, at 2 (1994)). The revised version of
the opinion issued in 1995 deleted all discussion of “temporary suspension of such bans.”
ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-386R, at 1 n.* (1995).
The revised opinion also clarified that citing an unpublished opinion to a court without
such a ban is not an ethical violation, even if the originating jurisdiction precludes its
citation. However, the lawyer must advise the court that the cited opinion was expressly
limited in reach by the issuing court. Id. at 2.
106
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(c) (2002).
107
See SUSAN R. MARTYN & LAWRENCE J. FOX, TRAVERSING THE ETHICAL
MINEFIELD: PROBLEMS, LAW, AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 103 (2004) (noting that
lawyer codes incorporate the vast external law of fraud); see also Chambers v. NASCO,
Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (inherent power of federal courts allow a judgment to be
vacated “upon proof that [] fraud has been perpetrated on the court”).
This “historic power of equity to set aside fraudulently begotten judgments[]” is
necessary to the integrity of the courts, for “tampering with the administration of justice
in [this] manner . . . involves far more than an injury to a single litigant. It is a wrong
against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public.”
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S.
238, 245-46 (1944)).
108
MARTYN & FOX, supra note 107, at 105.
109
See supra note 96 and accompanying text. However, opposing counsel who fails to
cite the “adverse authority” to the court is unlikely to charge the violator with fraud or
misrepresentation, if for no other reason than embarrassment for overlooking legal
authority supporting the client’s position.
110
See Hendrix, 986 F.2d at 200 (chastising counsel for failing to cite a published
opinion from the same circuit that the court would have had to overrule if counsel’s
appeal were to succeed); see also Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 641 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
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Various procedural rules also impose ethical responsibilities on
counsel to fully disclose relevant legal authority to the tribunal, including
111
Some circuits have
lower court opinions and unpublished decisions.
112
held, for example, that a failure to expressly acknowledge binding
adverse legal precedent violates Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.113 Others, however,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[U]nlike the Court, [parties]
cannot afford the luxury of ignoring inconvenient precedent . . . .”).
111
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 111 cmt. d, Reporter’s
Note (2000).
“Legal authority” includes not only case-law precedents, but also
statutes, ordinances, regulations, and administrative rulings. The obligation
to cite adverse case law is not limited to appellate decisions. A decision
must be cited even if the appeal remains pending, so long as applicable law
provides that the decision has force as precedent pending appeal.
Case-law precedent includes an unpublished memorandum opinion, an
unpublished report filed by a magistrate, and an adverse federal habeas
corpus ruling. The duty to disclose such unpublished materials may be of
great practical significance, because they are less likely to be discovered by
the tribunal itself.
Id. (internal citations omitted). But see id. (lawyer’s duty to disclose unpublished
authority should not apply in jurisdictions prohibiting citation of unpublished opinions).
112
See Hendrix, 986 F.2d at 201 (citing Thompson v. Duke, 940 F.2d 192, 196 n.2
(7th Cir. 1991)); see also, e.g., Precision Specialty Metals, Inc. v. United States, 315 F.3d
1346, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (upholding sanctions for FED. R. CIV. P. 11 violations for
concealing Supreme Court case of which counsel was or should have been aware; her
attempt to conceal it from the court and opposing counsel intentionally or negligently
misled the court and violated the attorney’s fundamental duty to be candid and
scrupulously accurate); Barth v. District of Columbia, 15 F.3d 1159, No. 92-7093, 1993
WL 523999 *4 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (duty of candor requires
erring on the side of disclosure in treating adverse authority so as not to impede trial
court’s disposition; endorsing an approach to Rule 11 sanctions comparable to that taken
in Hendrix under FED. R. APP. P. 38); DeSisto Coll., Inc. v. Line, 888 F.2d 755, 766
(11th Cir. 1989) (sanctioning plaintiff’s counsel for Rule 11 violation for failing to cite an
Eleventh Circuit decision directly contrary to client’s position that defendants were not
entitled to legislative immunity); Coastal Transfer Co. v. Toyota Motor Sales, 833 F.2d
208, 212 (9th Cir. 1987) (affirming FED. R. CIV. P. 11 sanctions awarded by trial court
and awarding double costs and attorney’s fees on appeal, in part for ignoring controlling
Supreme Court authority).
113
See Norfolk and Western R. Co., 814 F.2d 1192, 1198 (7th Cir. 1987). “The
ostrich-like tactic of pretending that potentially dispositive authority against a litigant’s
contention does not exist is as unprofessional as it is pointless.” Id. (citation omitted).
The pertinent portions of FED. R. CIV. P. 11 provide as follows:
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by
signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion,
or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the
best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,—
....
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment
of new law; . . . .

54

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 1:027

have rejected the view that Rule 11 imposes a duty of candor.114
Similarly, Fed. R. App. P. 38 has been invoked as the basis for
sanctioning attorneys who file frivolous appeals without citing
dispositive contrary authority.115
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the
court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may,
subject to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon
the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are
responsible for the violation.
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2), (c).
114
See, e.g., Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1988)
(reversing district court’s holding that Rule 11 imposes a “duty of candor” requiring
counsel to label arguments either as supported by existing law, or contrary to existing law
but supported by a good faith attempt to extend or modify the law).
We . . . hold that counsel may not be found to have violated Rule 11
merely for failing to “label” the argument advanced. Counsel should not be
sanctioned for choosing the wrong characterization for their theories.
If an attorney explains that after adequate preliminary research, in good
faith, he determined to seek reversal of a particular precedent, it is difficult
to see how the prefiling legal inquiry could be faulted. Nevertheless, while
proper argument identification may be a defense to a Rule 11 sanction,
errors in argument identification do not constitute a Rule 11 violation.
Of course, this is not to suggest that prudent attorneys should avoid
alerting the court when the position they advocate clearly departs from
settled and controlling legal precedent. Such argument identifications might
illuminate the thoroughness of the pre-filing legal investigation.
Id. at 96; see also Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1534,
1542 (9th Cir. 1986) (reversing holding that appellant violated Rule 11 by failing to state
that its position was grounded in a “‘good faith argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law’ rather than implying that it was ‘warranted by existing law,’”
and by failing to cite contrary authority in violation of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct) (quoting Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103
F.R.D. 124 (N.D. Cal. 1984)). See generally Daisy Hurst Floyd, Candor Versus
Advocacy: Courts’ Use of Sanctions to Enforce the Duty of Candor Toward the Tribunal,
29 GA. L. REV. 1035, 1058 (1995) (“Courts have not been consistent . . . in aligning a
decision on Rule 11 sanctions with Model Rule 3.3 standards.”).
115
See Hendrix, 986 F.2d at 201 (filing a frivolous suit or appeal, as well as filing a
suit or appeal for an improper purpose, are both sanctionable under FED. R. APP. P. 38).
The court does not ask whether the appeal might have been nonfrivolous if
presented differently, with arguments and authorities to which the appellant
in fact never alluded. If the appeal is blocked by authorities that the
appellant ignored, the appellant is sanctioned without inquiry into whether
the authorities if acknowledged might have been contested.
Id. at 200-01 (citing Brooks v. Allison Div., 874 F.2d 489 (7th Cir. 1989)); see also
McEnery v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 963 F.2d 1512, 1516-17 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (awarding
sanctions for violating FED. R. APP. P. 38 by failing to cite or discuss controlling
authority); Judith D. Fischer, Bareheaded and Barefaced Counsel: Courts React to
Unprofessionalism in Lawyers’ Papers, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1997). “The implicit
misrepresentation of bringing unfounded claims is . . . covered by the Model Rules,
which provided that a ‘lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding . . . unless there is a
basis for doing so that is not frivolous.’” Id. (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
R. 3.1 (1997)).
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The federal circuits’ no-citation rules establish a dangerous ethical
dilemma for the federal bar. They directly conflict with ethical duties
imposed on attorneys by the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
and their counterparts, by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, and by Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
No-citation rules have been adopted under the rather indeterminate
statutory authority of the various federal circuits to issue local procedural
rules.116 However, because Rule 11 and Rule 38 are uniform procedural
rules that Congress has tacitly endorsed under the Rules Enabling Act,117
they control over any conflicting nonuniform local rule prohibiting or
even discouraging citation of relevant legal authority, published or not.
As such, the local rules are arguably preempted by the nationally
sanctioned procedural rules and therefore amount to a legal nullity.118
Even in federal circuits that insist on strictly enforcing no-citation
rules notwithstanding the fact that they are irreconcilable with an
119
attorney’s duty of candor, an attorney may ethically decline to comply
with the rules by simply asserting a belief that no obligation to comply

116

See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2071(a) (2005); FED. R. APP. P. 47(a)(1). All local rules,
however, are preempted to the extent they are inconsistent with Acts of Congress and
general rules of practice and procedure adopted by the United States Supreme Court
under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2072 (2005). “Such rules shall be consistent with Acts of Congress
and rules of practice and procedure prescribed under section 2072 of this title.” Id.; see
FED. R. APP. P. 47(a)(1) (providing that “local rule[s] must be consistent with - but not
duplicative of - Acts of Congress and rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. § 2072”).
117
28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2071-2072 (2005).
118
See supra note 116 (interpreting 28 U.S.C.A. § 2071(a) (2005)).
119
See, e.g., In re Violation of Rule 28(c), 388 F.3d 1383, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004), in
which a panel of the Federal Circuit directed counsel to demonstrate why it should not
impose sanctions for filing a reply brief contrary to FED. R. APP. P. 28(c). The panel
declined to impose sanctions, accepting the attorney’s representation that the violation
was inadvertent. Id. at 1385. However, the panel quoted FED. R. APP. P. 46(c), which
permits a court of appeals to discipline an attorney for failure to comply with any court
rule after affording reasonable notice, an opportunity to show cause, and a hearing if
requested. Id. at 1385 n.1. The panel continued:
This court, in order to get its work done, must insist on strict compliance
with its rules. Violations of Rule 28(c)—and of other procedural rules such
as Federal Circuit Rule 47.6 which prohibits the citation of nonprecedential
opinions, or the rules governing situations in which a cross-appeal is
appropriate—are all too frequent. In addition to imposing an unfair burden
on opposing parties, violations of our rules also burden the court. The court
must consider a large number of appeals each year. It can only conduct its
work fairly and efficiently if counsel cooperate by abiding by the pertinent
rules.
Id. at 1385 (emphasis added); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING
LAWYERS § 111 cmt. d, Reporter’s Note (2000) (stating that the duty to disclose
unpublished adverse authority should not apply in jurisdictions that prohibit citation of
unpublished opinions).
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exists.120 An attorney who has a legitimate basis to believe that an
unpublished decision of a circuit court is the most relevant and
persuasive authority on point has an ethical obligation to cite it, as an
121
officer of both the court and the judicial system as a whole.
Anything
to the contrary in a local circuit rule, which by its very nature has never
been submitted to the United States Supreme Court or Congress for
approval under the Rules Enabling Act, is not worth the paper (or the
website, for that matter) on which it is published.
IV. ARNOLD V. KOZINSKI: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
DUEL THAT FUELED THE FIRE
In 1999, the ongoing debate about unpublished circuit court
opinions escalated to a higher profile with the publication of counterpoint
articles by two noted judges, Judge Richard S. Arnold122 of the Eighth
Circuit and Judge Alex Kozinski123 of the Ninth Circuit. Presaging their
imminent legal jousting match,124 Judge Arnold argued that “all decisions
have precedential significance.”125 He reasoned, “When a governmental
official, judge or not, acts contrary to what was done on a previous day,
without giving reasons, and perhaps for no reason other than a change of
mind, . . . the power that is being exercised [cannot] properly be called
“judicial[.]”126 Rather, he contended that unpublished decisionmaking
was “more like legislative power, which can be exercised whenever the
legislator thinks best, and without regard to prior decisions[.]”127

120

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(c) (2002).
See FED R. CIV. P. 11(b); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a) (2002); see
also supra note 84 (discussing Proposed Federal Rule of Professional Conduct 7); cf.
FED. R. APP. P. 38 (authorizing sanctions for filing frivolous appeals). “[C]itation of
[unpublished] opinions may sometimes be ethically required by duty to client if they are
the most persuasive precedents available in common sense terms.” William T. Hangley,
Opinions Hidden, Citations Forbidden: Report and Recommendations of the American
College of Trial Lawyers on the Publication and Citation of Nonbinding Federal Circuit
Court Opinions, 208 F.R.D. 645, 665 n.73 (2002).
122
Richard S. Arnold, Unpublished Opinions: A Comment, 1 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 219 (1999).
123
Alex Kozinski & Stephen Reinhardt, Please Don’t Cite This! Why We Don’t
Allow Citation to Unpublished Opinions, CAL. LAW. 43 (June 2000), available at
http://www.nonpublication.com/don’t%20cite%20this.htm (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
124
Compare Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000), vacated as
moot on reh’g, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) with Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th
Cir. 2001).
125
Arnold, supra note 122, at 222.
126
Id. at 226.
127
Id.
121
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128

For his part, Judge Kozinski bluntly asserted, “So far as Ninth
Circuit law is concerned, memdispos [unpublished memorandum
dispositions] are a nullity.”129 Noting the crushing workload of the Ninth
Circuit, Judge Kozinski argued that nonpublication plans offer a feasible
solution. “Not worrying about making law in 3,800 memdispos frees us
to concentrate on those dispositions that affect others besides the parties
to the appeal—the published opinions.”130 Further, he noted,
Using the language of a memdispo to predict how the court
131
would decide a different case would be highly misleading. . . .
Trying to extract from memdispos a precedential value that we
didn’t put into them . . . would also damage the court in
important and permanent ways. . . . [W]e can say with
confidence that citation of memdispos is an uncommonly bad
idea. We urge lawyers to drop it once and for all.132

128

Judge Kozinski’s co-author, Stephen Reinhardt, is also a Ninth Circuit judge. See
How Appealing’s Twenty Questions Site, Questions 15, 16 (Feb. 2, 2004) (interviewing
Judge Reinhardt in part concerning his friendship with Judge Kozinski and his defense of
the Ninth Circuit’s local rule prohibiting citation of unpublished opinions), at
http://legalaffairs.org/howappealing/20q/2004_02_01_20q-appellateblog_archive.html
(last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
129
Kozinski & Reinhardt, supra note 123, at 43.
130
Id. The authors’ remark begs the question of whether opinions designated as
nonprecedential affect non-parties. However, as one commentator has observed, “there
are many unpublished decisions that do present important legal questions, the resolution
of which have substantial implications for individuals other than the parties involved.”
Norman R. Williams, The Failings of Originalism: The Federal Courts and the Power of
Precedent, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 761, 776 (2004). Further, the robust proprietary
market for those opinions belies the authors’ assumption that they affect only the parties
to the appeal.
[L]awyers, district court judges, and appellate judges regularly read
unpublished opinions despite local prohibitions against citing them. Citation
of unpublished opinions by lawyers and judges provide[s] further evidence
of the value of unpublished opinions.
Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure to the
Chief Justice of the United States and Members of the Judicial Conference of the United
States 11 (September 2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/jc092004/JCReport.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005). Unpublished opinions offer valuable
insight and information. Id. In addition, they are also helpful when addressing recurring
issues that involve similar fact patterns. Id. Finally, unpublished opinions can be
particularly helpful to district judges who strive for uniformity when applying relatively
settled law to novel facts. Id.; Pether, supra note 21, at 1532 (“[T]he practice of many
lawyers and judges belies the claim that unpublished decisions are ‘nonprecedential’. . .
.”); see also Caron v. United States, 183 F. Supp. 2d 149, 158 & n.7 (D. Mass. 2001)
(Young, C.J.) (“[T]here is no genuine tension between district court decisions which cite
‘unpublished’ appellate decisions and the local circuit ‘no-citation’ rules[]” because
district judges are required to cite the sources on which they base their reasoning.).
131
Kozinski & Reinhardt, supra note 123, at 44.
132
Id. at 81.

58

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 1:027

Late in 2000, not long after the sparring circuit judges publicly
staked out their respective positions in legal commentary, Judge Arnold
presided over a three-judge panel that issued a startling published
opinion—Anastasoff v. United States.133 The panel announced that the
Eighth Circuit’s local rule134 that “disfavored” citation of unpublished
opinions (but nevertheless permitted them to be cited for their persuasive
value under certain circumstances) exceeded the scope of judicial power
conferred by Article III of the United States Constitution.135 In reaching
his conclusion, Judge Arnold issued a call to arms: Anastasoff declared
unconstitutional the Eighth Circuit’s local rule providing that
136
“unpublished” opinions may not be cited as precedent.
He reasoned
that the court’s rule deeming unpublished opinions to be nonprecedential
exceeded the scope of Article III because the judiciary’s selective
publication rules had the effect of usurping the legislative domain.137
Although the Anastasoff opinion was vacated on rehearing after the
underlying dispute was resolved,138 Judge Arnold’s direct challenge to
the long-standing practice of issuing unpublished opinions took on a life
139
Not long after Anastasoff was vacated, Judge Kozinski
of its own.
140
returned the volley
on behalf of the Ninth Circuit in Hart v.
141
In Hart, Judge Kozinski took Judge Arnold to task,
Massanari.
harshly criticizing his constitutional analysis:
The question raised by Anastasoff is whether one particular
aspect of the binding authority principle—the decision of which
133

223 F.3d 898, vacated as moot on reh’g, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
8TH CIR. R. 28A(i) (1998) (version in effect at the time Anastasoff was decided).
135
Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 905.
.
136
Id.
137
See id. at 901. “The judicial power to determine law is a power only to determine
what the law is, not to invent it.” Id. (citing 1 Blackstone, COMMENTARIES *69).
Although Judge Arnold grounded his constitutional challenge on the limitations Article
III imposes on the power of the federal courts, it also could be persuasively characterized
as a separation of powers argument. See id. (“In addition to keeping the law stable, this
doctrine is also essential, according to Blackstone, for the separation of legislative and
judicial power.”).
138
Anastasoff v. United States, 235 F.3d 1054 (en banc), vacating 223 F.3d 898 (8th
Cir. 2000).
139
See, e.g., Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 256 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 2001)
(Smith, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“Anastasoff has generated
substantial controversy, and its historical research and conclusions have been
criticized.”).
140
“Judge Arnold is one of the ornaments of the federal judiciary, a judge widely
respected for his erudition and wisdom. But even Homer nods, and Judge Arnold took a
big nod on this one. While his argument in Anastasoff has superficial appeal, closer
examination exposes its flaws.” Unpublished Judicial Opinions, supra note 60, at 14-15
(prepared statement of Alex Kozinski).
141
266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001).
134
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rulings of an appellate court are binding—is a matter of judicial
policy or constitutional imperative. We believe Anastasoff erred
in holding that, as a constitutional matter, courts of appeals may
not decide which of their opinions will be deemed binding on
themselves and the courts below them. For the reasons
explained, the principle of strict binding authority is itself not
constitutional, but rather a matter of judicial policy. Were it
otherwise, it would cast doubt on the federal court practice of
limiting the binding effect of appellate decisions to the courts of
a particular circuit. Circuit boundaries—and the very system of
circuit courts—are a matter of judicial administration, not
constitutional law.142
....
Unlike the Anastasoff court, we are unable to find within Article
III of the Constitution a requirement that all case dispositions and
orders issued by appellate courts be binding authority. On the
contrary, we believe that an inherent aspect of our function as
Article III judges is managing precedent to develop a coherent
body of circuit law to govern litigation in our court and the other
courts of this circuit. We agree with Anastasoff that we—and all
courts—must follow the law. But we do not think that this
means we must also make binding law every time we issue a
merits decision. The common law has long recognized that
certain types of cases do not deserve to be authorities, and that
one important aspect of the judicial function is separating the
cases that should be precedent from those that should not.
Without clearer guidance than that offered in Anastasoff, we see
no constitutional basis for abdicating this important aspect of our
judicial responsibility.143

142
Id. at 1175-76. But see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (authorizing Congress to
“constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court”); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“judicial
power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish”); 28 U.S.C.A. § 48
(2005) (establishing circuit boundaries).
143
266 F.3d at 1180 (internal footnote omitted). Effective July 1, 2000, less than a
year before Hart was issued, the Ninth Circuit adopted a temporary rule permitting
citation of unpublished decisions under limited circumstances. Originally set to expire on
December 31, 2002, the temporary rule has since been extended until July 1, 2005. See
9th Cir. Rule 36-3 advisory committee’s note. The temporary rule upheld by Hart reads
as follows:
Circuit Rule 36-3. Citation of Unpublished Dispositions or Orders
(a) Not Precedent: Unpublished dispositions and orders of this Court are not
binding precedent, except when relevant under the doctrine of law of the
case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
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In the wake of Anastasoff and Hart, other federal circuits have
generally followed the Ninth Circuit’s position as espoused in Hart.144
The Fifth Circuit, for example, apparently adopted the Ninth Circuit’s
position that unpublished decisions need not have precedential value145

(b) Citation: Unpublished dispositions and orders of this Court may not be
cited to or by the courts of this circuit except in the following circumstances.
(i) They may be cited to this Court or to or by any other court in this
circuit when relevant under the doctrine of law of the case, res judicata,
or collateral estoppel.
(ii) They may be cited to this Court or by any other courts in this circuit
for factual purposes, such as to show double jeopardy, sanctionable
conduct, notice, entitlement to attorneys’ fees, or the existence of a
related case.
(iii) They may be cited to this Court in a request to publish a disposition
or order made pursuant to Circuit Rule 36-4, or in a petition for panel
rehearing or rehearing en banc, in order to demonstrate the existence of a
conflict among opinions, dispositions, or orders.
(c) Attach Copy: A copy of any cited unpublished disposition or order must
be attached to the document in which it is cited, as an appendix.
9th CIR. R. 36-3. The previous version of Rule 36-3 was even more restrictive,
prohibiting citation of unpublished opinions in briefs, oral argument, opinions,
memoranda, or orders except for purposes of the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
or collateral estoppel. See 9TH CIR. R. 36-3 (effective July 1, 1995).
144
In addition to its decision in Hart, the Ninth Circuit has rejected two other
constitutional challenges to the rule, in both cases for lack of standing. In Schmier v. U.S.
Ct. of Appeals for Ninth Cir., 279 F.3d 817 (9th Cir. 2002), the constitutionality of the
Ninth Circuit’s rule was directly challenged by an attorney who is well-known for his
opposition to no-citation rules. See generally The Committee for the Rule of Law—
Overview, at http://www.nonpublication.com/WELCOME.HTML (last visited Feb. 27,
2005). Schmier chairs the Committee for the Rule of Law, “a group of concerned
lawyers, academics, jurists, and other citizens.” Id. His complaint sought a writ of
mandamus or prohibition, asserting several constitutional grounds barring enforcement of
the Ninth Circuit’s rule prohibiting citation of unpublished opinions. 279 F.3d at 819.
Although the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment dismissing his claim
with prejudice for lack of standing, id. at 823-24, the court noted, “Given the wide range
of interest shown in the debate about unpublished opinions, and assuming that parties
with personal stakes in live controversies will properly raise the issue with the federal
courts, we think it is only a matter of time before the theoretical questions raised by
Schmier’s complaint are all properly presented and resolved.” Id. at 825.
In a more recent appeal by an unsuccessful habeas corpus petitioner who
challenged the constitutionality of its no-citation rules, the Ninth Circuit once again
affirmed a judgment dismissing the claim for lack of standing. See Loritz v. U.S. Ct. of
Appeals for Ninth Cir., 382 F.3d 990, 992 (9th Cir. 2004).
145
In the Fifth Circuit, any unpublished opinion issued on or after January 1, 1996,
has persuasive but not precedential value, except under the doctrines of res judicata,
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case. 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. The unpublished decision at
issue in Williams was decided in 1999 and therefore was not binding. See Anderson v.
DART, 180 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 1999) (table of unreported decisions) (affirmed without
argument). Disregarding Anderson, the Williams panel instead decided the merits by
applying the analysis in Clark v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1986), an earlier
published decision. See Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 242 F.3d at 315, 318-19
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when it denied rehearing en banc in Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid
Transit.146 The defendant asserted governmental immunity, relying on
the most recent decision on point, an unpublished opinion issued in
147
1999.
That decision specifically held that Dallas Area Rapid Transit
148
However, the Williams panel, relying
(DART) was immune from suit.
on a 1986 published decision to which DART had not been a party, held
149
that the defendant was not entitled to governmental immunity.
The
Williams court held that the published opinion controlled, rejecting the
defendant’s assertion of immunity based on the more recent—and more
150
specific—unpublished opinion.
The judge who authored Williams
later dissented to the order denying DART a rehearing en banc:
[T]his is an opportunity to revisit the questionable practice of
denying precedential status to unpublished opinions. Although I
believe the panel reached a correct result, I respectfully dissent
from the denial of rehearing en banc, which would have given
this court an opportunity to examine the question of unpublished
opinions generally, an issue that is important to the fair
151
administration of justice in this circuit.

In In re Bagdade,152 the Seventh Circuit cited Hart with approval
when it considered imposing sanctions against an attorney, in part for
(citing Clark as controlling authority), reh’g en banc denied, 256 F.3d 260 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1042 (2001).
146
256 F.3d 260 (5th Cir. 2001) (Smith, J., joined by Jones and DeMoss, JJ.,
dissenting) (denying petition for rehearing en banc). Judge Smith authored the original
opinion in Williams. See Williams, 242 F.3d at 317.
147
See Anderson v. DART, 180 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 1999) (table of unreported
decisions), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1062 (1999). In Anderson, the Fifth Circuit affirmed,
without argument, the unpublished decision of a federal magistrate judge holding that
DART was entitled to governmental immunity. See Anderson v. DART, No. CA3:97CV-1834-BC, 1998 WL 686782 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 1998). The unpublished opinion of
the lower court in Anderson did not mention Clark v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d 736 (5th
Cir. 1986), on which the Williams court later relied to hold that DART was not immune
from suit.
148
See Anderson, 1998 WL 686782, at *8.
149
Williams, 242 F.3d at 317, 318-19 (citing Clark v. Tarrant County, 798 F.2d 736
(5th Cir. 1986)).
150
Id. at 318 n.1 (citing Anderson v. DART, No. CA3:97-CV-1834-BC, 1998 WL
686782 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 1998), aff’d, 180 F.3d 265 (5th Cir. 1999) (table of
unreported decisions), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1062 (1999)).
151
256 F.3d at 261 (internal citation omitted) (Smith, J., dissenting). “The law is
supposed to inform the choices of potential litigants. How can this circuit’s decisions do
so, if they carry no predictive effect?” Id. at 263.
152
334 F.3d 568, 583 (7th Cir. 2003). “Generally, sanctions have not been imposed
solely for citation to an unpublished order if it appears that the attorney’s violation was
not willful.” Id. (citing Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1180 (9th Cir. 2001) and
Sorchini v. City of Covina, 250 F.3d 706 (9th Cir. 2001)). In Sorchini, a per curiam
opinion that predated Hart, the court held, “Unpublished dispositions are neither
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citing an unpublished order in violation of the circuit’s local rule.153 In
Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson Medical, Education & Research
154
the defendant, relying on two unpublished,
Foundation,
nonprecedential decisions, argued that the Federal Circuit had rejected
155
prosecution laches as a defense to a claim of patent infringement.
The
Federal Circuit politely rejected Anastasoff’s holding that unpublished
decisions must be treated as precedential, and instead “subscribe[d] to
the comprehensive, scholarly treatment of the issue in refutation of
Anastasoff set out in Hart.”156 The panel found it unnecessary to “do
little more than signal [its] agreement with it by synopsizing the main
points” because “Judge Kozinski’s opinion for the Hart court [was] so
thorough.”157
Sister circuits thus have generally followed the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning in Hart rather than the Eighth Circuit’s rationale in Anastasoff.
Nevertheless, a number of federal district courts continue to cite
unpublished circuit court opinions at least as persuasive authority, even
while openly acknowledging their nonprecedential status under some
local circuit rules.158 In a recent decision, for example, the United States

persuasive nor controlling authority, and the limited exceptions to the noncitation rule
contained in section (b) [of Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3] are not intended to change that.”
Sorchini, 250 F.3d at 709 (2-1 decision). Judge Kozinski also took part as a member of
the Sorchini majority. Id. at 707.
153
Bagdade, 334 F.3d at 583 (citing 7TH CIR. R. 53(b)(2)(iv) (2002)).
154
277 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
155
Id. at 1363.
156
Id. at 1367 (citation omitted).
157
Id. at 1367 n.* (so designated in original).
158
See, e.g., Griffy’s Landscape Maint. LLC v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 667, 673
(2001) (Baskir, C.J.), quoted in Watson v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health and Human Servs.,
No. 96-639V, 2001 WL 1682537, *18 n.33 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 18, 2001) (unreported); Giese
v. Pierce Chem. Co., 43 F. Supp. 2d 98, 104 n.1 (D. Mass. 1999) (Young, C.J.)
(acknowledging that while an unpublished opinion was “‘not citable as precedent’ under
FED. CIR. LOC. R. 47.6(b)[, t]his hardly means . . . that it cannot be cited at all”); see also
Caron v. United States, 183 F. Supp. 2d 149, 158 & n.7 (D. Mass. 2001) (Young, C.J.)
(defending position that unpublished federal appellate court opinions may be cited by the
district court for their persuasive value notwithstanding local circuit rules to the
contrary).
The establishment of publication rules has proven to be a watershed
event in the history of federal court case law. Prior to this time, all or very
nearly all federal appellate court opinions in the United States were
published in print. However, the publication rules have so systematically
reduced the number of published opinions that currently more than 79
percent of federal circuit court opinions are unpublished.
Ironically, citation rules have had no effect whatsoever on actual
publication and the associated legal research costs. Lawbook publishers
have simply gone ahead and published the so-called “unpublished” judicial
decisions, noting them as such. Indeed, the lawbook publishers must relish
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District Court for the District of Massachusetts opined that it was bound
by an unpublished opinion of the First Circuit, even though the same
opinion might not be binding on other panels of the First Circuit.159
After acknowledging the holdings of both Anastasoff and Hart, the court
found the reasoning of Anastasoff “especially compelling,” and therefore
treated the First Circuit’s unpublished decision with “great care and
respect.”160 Finally, district courts in the Ninth Circuit have narrowly
the additional pages of decisions now being devoted to debating the
propriety of the no-citation rules.
....
It suffices here simply to say that, at least within the First Circuit, I
believe the no-citation rule has no application to judicial opinions. Giese, 43
F. Supp. 2d at 103 n.1.
More generally, I believe fundamentally that judges are society’s
teachers of the law. As Professor William Christianson has said, “[t]eaching
is a very special kind of caring.” In everything we do and say as judges, our
society expects us to epitomize and articulate its most basic values.
Basic to the discharge of my judicial duty, therefore, is the duty to
explain clearly, to teach why I am deciding as I do. Where an unpublished
decision persuades me and best explains the course of my own reasoning, I
cite it. While the courts of appeal properly mull the precedential effect of
their decisions on the development of the law, that aspect of no-citation
rules is, thus far, of no moment to me. My citation means only that I find the
readily available unpublished decision persuasive, just as I would had the
same three appellate judges in my circuit (or the circuit within which I am
sitting) collaborated in a published law review article. My citation,
therefore, is an acknowledgment of such reasoning, a sign of respect to the
authors, and an explanation to the public that I found such reasoning
persuasive. It is only in this fashion that the common law can grow.
Finally, there is no genuine tension between district court decisions
which cite “unpublished” appellate decisions and the local circuit “nocitation” rules. Unlike an attorney, under the Federal Rules of Civil and
Criminal Procedure, I am expressly and properly required to state my
reasoning. FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a); FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(e), (g). I would violate
these rules were I to fail to cite a source I actually used to inform my
reasoning. Moreover, these nationally uniform rules adopted pursuant to the
Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-72, take precedence over any locally
adopted rule, id.; United States v. Claros, 17 F.3d 1041, 1045 (7th Cir.1994)
(“A local rule may not be inconsistent with the Constitution, a statute of the
United States, or with a national rule governing the conduct of litigation in
the United States courts.”).
Id. (emphasis in original; internal citations to secondary sources omitted).
159
Alshrafi v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 150, 159-60 (D. Mass. 2004)
(Young, C.J.).
160
Id. at 160 n.9. The district court nevertheless held that the appellate court’s opinion
was readily distinguishable. Id. After quoting 1ST CIR. R. 32.3(a)(2), which disfavors the
citation of unpublished opinions, the court “note[d] with some concern . . . that the
constitutionality of this local rule is suspect under the reasoning of Anastasoff.” Id. at
160 n.10.
Although a full discussion is beyond the scope of this article, state courts have also
addressed the constitutional controversy. For example, the Arkansas Supreme Court has
explicitly rejected a claim that its rule prohibiting parties from citing unpublished
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interpreted the local no-citation rule, which purports to preclude citation
of unpublished opinions “to or by” the courts of that circuit.161 The
lower courts have held that the rule does not bar a district court within
the Ninth Circuit from considering unpublished decisions of other courts,
including district courts within the circuit, as persuasive authority.162
V. THE ETHICAL QUESTION BEGGED BY THE
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE
Although Anastasoff and Hart are the leading cases in the
controversy over unpublished opinions, they are distinguishable from a
factual, procedural, and ethical standpoint. In Anastasoff, the only
Eighth Circuit decision directly on point was an unpublished opinion that
163
was directly adverse to Faye Anastasoff’s claim for a tax refund.
The
taxpayer’s counsel cited the opinion but argued it should not apply,164
citing the Eighth Circuit’s local rule providing that unpublished opinions
opinions of the state court of appeals violated a criminal defendant’s due process rights
under either the United States or Arkansas Constitutions. See Weatherford v. State, 101
S.W.3d 227, 231, 234 (Ark. 2003) (upholding ARK. SUP. CT. R. 5-2(d)). More recently,
in Schaaf v. Kaufman, 850 A.2d 655, 657-58 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004), the Pennsylvania
Superior Court granted appellee’s motion to strike a citation in appellant’s brief to an
unpublished memorandum decision, invoking Pa. Sup. Ct. Internal Operating Procedure
65.37(A). The court rejected appellant’s argument that the rule violated the Pennsylvania
Constitution’s Vesting Clause and Due Course of Law Clause. Id. at 658.
Perhaps in response to Weatherford, 2005 House Bill 1107 was recently introduced in the
Arkansas General Assembly for the purpose of permitting citation of unpublished
opinions. Specifically, the bill would strike language in ARK. SUP. CT. R. 5-2(d) that
currently prohibits citation of unpublished opinions of the Arkansas Court of Appeals.
See H.B. 1107, 85th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2005), available at http://
www.arkleg.state.ar.us/ftproot/bills/2005/public/HB1107.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
161
9TH CIR. R. 36-3(b).
With minor exceptions dealing with subjects like res judicata and double
jeopardy, none of the judges of our circuit—district judges, magistrate
judges, bankruptcy judges, even circuit judges—may rely on these
unpublished dispositions in making their decisions. . . . The prohibition is
narrow: It prohibits citation to or reliance on unpublished dispositions where
this would influence the decision-making process of a judge of one of the
courts of our circuit. In that context, and that context alone, the unpublished
disposition may not be considered.
Unpublished Judicial Opinions, supra note 60, at 12 (prepared statement of Alex
Kozinski).
162
See Herring v. Teradyne, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1128 n.2 (S.D. Cal. 2002)
(citing Alvarenga-Villalobos v. Reno, 133 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1167-68 (N.D. Cal. 2000)
(holding that Ninth Circuit rule does not bar citation of unpublished Third Circuit
decision) and In re Antablian, 140 B.R. 534, 536 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (holding that Ninth
Circuit Rule does not bar citation of unpublished opinions of any court other than Ninth
Circuit)).
163
Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 899, vacated as moot on reh’g, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir.
2000).
164
Id. at 899, 905.
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are not precedent.165 Judge Arnold’s opinion concluded that the local
rule’s treatment of unpublished opinions as nonprecedential exceeded the
circuit court’s constitutional power under Article III.166 Having done so,
the panel conferred precedential status on the only relevant decision ever
issued by the Eighth Circuit,167 reaffirmed it, and held that it barred the
tax refund.168
Notably, Anastasoff did not address the ethical implications of nocitation rules. To the contrary, the Eighth Circuit’s Rule 28A(i)
permitted citation of the relevant unpublished opinion under the
circumstances, and counsel for both parties openly advocated their
respective positions as to whether the court should follow the cited
decision.169 The issue in Anastasoff was whether the local rule required
the court to disregard the unpublished decision, even in the absence of
165

See 8TH CIR. R. 28A(i).
Rule 28A. Briefs
....
(i) Citation of Unpublished Opinion. Unpublished opinions are decisions
which a court designates for unpublished status. They are not precedent and
parties generally should not cite them. When relevant to establishing the
doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case, however,
the parties may cite any unpublished opinion. Parties may also cite an
unpublished opinion of this court if the opinion has persuasive value on a
material issue and no published opinion of this or another court would serve
as well. . . . When citing an unpublished opinion, a party must indicate the
opinion’s unpublished status.
Id. (emphasis added).
166
Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 905.
The judicial power of the United States is limited by the doctrine of
precedent. Rule 28A(i) allows courts to ignore this limit. If we mark an
opinion as unpublished, Rule 28A(i) provides that is not precedent. Though
prior decisions may be well-considered and directly on point, Rule 28A(i)
allows us to depart from the law set out in such prior decisions without any
reason to differentiate the cases. This discretion is completely inconsistent
with the doctrine of precedent; even in constitutional cases, courts “have
always required a departure from precedent to be supported by some
‘special justification.’” United States v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 517 U.S.
843, 856 (1996) (quoting Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 842 (1991)
(Souter, J., concurring)). Rule 28A(i) expands the judicial power beyond the
limits set by Article III by allowing us complete discretion to determine
which judicial decisions will bind us and which will not. Insofar as it limits
the precedential effect of our prior decisions, the Rule is therefore
unconstitutional.
Id.
167
223 F.3d at 899 (citing Christie v. United States, No. 91-2375MN (8th Cir. Mar.
20, 1992) (per curiam) (unpublished)).
168
Id. at 905. “Ms. Anastasoff’s interpretation of [26 U.S.C.] § 7502 was directly
addressed and rejected in Christie. EIGHTH CIR. R. 28A(i) does not free us from our
obligation to follow that decision.” Id. (internal footnote omitted).
169
See 223 F.3d at 899; see also Brief for the Appellee at 3 n.2, 2000 WL 34017025,
Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000) (No. 99-3917).
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170

When
any other directly applicable authority from the same circuit.
Anastasoff was vacated on rehearing, Judge Arnold, writing for the
majority, specifically held, “The constitutionality of that portion of Rule
28A(i) which says that unpublished opinions have no precedential effect
remains an open question in this Circuit.”171 Today, the Eighth Circuit’s
Local Rule 28A(i) remains unchanged, and courts in that circuit continue
to rely on it to restrict, but not prohibit, citation of unpublished
opinions.172
In Hart, on the other hand, an attorney’s professional conduct was
directly at issue. The appeal challenged the denial of a claim for

Supplemental Security Income benefits under the Social Security
Act.173 Appellant’s counsel cited an unpublished decision in a footnote

in his opening brief.174 When the court sua sponte ordered him to show
170
171

2000).

223 F.3d at 899.
Anastasoff v. United States, 235 F.3d 1054, 1056, vacating 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir.

172
See, e.g., United States v. Yirkovsky, 338 F.3d 936, 946 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003)
(Heaney, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that Rule 28A(i) remains binding in the Eighth
Circuit); see also Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 905 (Heaney, J., concurring) (“I agree fully with
Judge Arnold’s opinion. He has done the public, the court, and the bar a great service by
writing so fully and cogently on the precedential effect of unpublished opinions.”).
173
Hart v. Massanari, 20 Fed. Appx. 668, 669, No. 99-56472, 2001 WL 1135601, at
*1 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 2001).
174
Hart, 266 F.3d at 1158-59. Ironically, the unpublished opinion that triggered Judge
Kozinski’s 24-page treatise was not even listed in the appellant’s table of authorities;
rather, it was cited only in a footnote in appellant’s opening brief, and only for the
purpose of advising the panel that the Ninth Circuit had not previously ruled on the
merits of the issue in dispute. See Appellant’s Opening Brief at n.6, Hart v. Massanari, 20
Fed. Appx. 668 (9th Cir. 2001) (99-56472). Appellant’s counsel cited the unpublished
opinion neither for its precedential value nor its persuasive value; rather, the unpublished
opinion was cited only to demonstrate that the Ninth Circuit, unlike several others, had
never reached the merits of the substantive issue. See id. The fact that the published
opinion in Hart was a thinly disguised advisory opinion addressing the precedential value
of unpublished dispositions is illustrated by the brevity of the Ninth Circuit’s two-page
unpublished opinion on the merits. See Hart, 20 Fed. Appx. 668 (9th Cir. 2001) (9956472) (unpublished opinion).
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cause why he should not be sanctioned for citing the unpublished
decision in violation of the Ninth Circuit’s no-citation rule,175 the
attorney responded that the local rule might be unconstitutional under the
ruling in Anastasoff.176 In reply, Judge Kozinski took the opportunity to
write a lengthy published (and therefore citable) opinion defending the
Ninth Circuit’s no-citation rules in light of Anastasoff.177 In the end,
however, the panel declined to impose any sanctions at all and
discharged the show cause order.178
Scholarly commentary in the wake of Anastasoff and Hart has been
prolific, particularly with respect to the constitutionality of local rules
limiting the precedential value of unpublished opinions. Nevertheless,
few if any commentators have addressed the ethical implications of
nonuniform local rules governing the precedential status and citability of
unpublished dispositions. Focusing on the difficulty of reconciling
conflicting obligations, the second part of this article explores the ethical
dilemmas no-citation rules impose on the federal bar, particularly the
increasing number of attorneys who practice in more than one circuit.179
Published commentary by practicing attorneys offers a pragmatic
perspective on the current patchwork of local citation rules among the

175
Hart, 266 F.3d at 1159; see 9TH CIR. R. 36-3(a), (b) (“Unpublished dispositions
and orders of this Court are not binding precedent . . . . [and generally] may not be cited
to or by the courts of this circuit . . . .”).
176
Hart, 266 F.3d at 1159. “Anastasoff, while vacated, continues to have persuasive
force. It may seduce members of our bar into violating our Rule 36-3 under the mistaken
impression that it is unconstitutional. We write to lay these speculations to rest.” Id.
(internal citation omitted).
177
Id. at 1159-80. Hart acknowledged in passing that “[o]ur rule, unlike that of the
Eighth Circuit, prohibits citation of an unpublished disposition to any of the courts of our
circuit. The Eighth Circuit’s rule allows citation in some circumstances, but provides that
the authority is persuasive rather than binding.” Id. at 1160 n.2.
178
Id. at 1180. In a single concluding paragraph, the panel succinctly addressed
whether to impose sanctions against appellant’s counsel for violating 9TH CIR. R. 36-3:
Contrary to counsel’s contention, then, we conclude that Rule 36-3 is
constitutional. We also find that counsel violated the rule. Nevertheless, we
are aware that Anastasoff may have cast doubt on our rule’s constitutional
validity. Our rules are obviously not meant to punish attorneys who, in good
faith, seek to test a rule’s constitutionality. We therefore conclude that the
violation was not willful and exercise our discretion not to impose sanctions.
Id.
179
See Memorandum to Judge Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure, from Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory
Committee on Appellate Rules (May 22, 2003), at 30, 38, available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/AP5-2003.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005) (noting two
reasons for the proposed new rule: (1) local circuit rules on citation differ dramatically,
and (2) the differences create a particular hardship for practitioners who practice in more
than one circuit).
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circuits.180 This part of the article summarizes the various functions
served by federal circuit opinions and the disparate effects of circuit
publication plans. Second, this part discusses the ethical duty of candor
and procedural rules imposing the risk of sanctions on attorneys who
violate their ethical duties as officers of the court. Third, proposed Fed.
R. App. P. 32.1 is discussed, including the somewhat tenuous present
status of the proposed new rule and its potential remedial effect on the
ethical dilemmas posed by no-citation rules. Fourth, the article discusses
the implications of the E-Government Act of 2002 as it directly applies
to the availability of judicial opinions issued by the federal courts of
appeals. Finally, the article recommends a legislative solution, if the
Judicial Conference and ultimately the United States Supreme Court fail
to exercise their supervisory and statutory authority to ensure uniformity
among the circuits by overriding local no-citation rules.
VI. THE MULTIPLE FUNCTIONS OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND THE
DISPARATE EFFECTS OF CIRCUIT PUBLICATION PLANS
Decisions rendered by a federal court of appeals, like those of any
other appellate court, serve three primary functions: dispositive,
181
predictive, and lawmaking.
Under the first and most pragmatic
perspective, an appellate court decision simply serves a dispositive
function: to resolve the legal dispute pending before the court.182 The
180
Compare, e.g., Charles L. Babcock, The Problem with Unpublished Opinions, 20
COMM. LAWYER 13, 14 (Spring 2002) (opposing no-citation rules); Hangley, supra note
121, at 690-91 (supporting rules permitting citation of “unpublished” decisions in the
interest of effective advocacy); Andrew M. Low, Unpublished Opinions, 32 COLO. LAW.
39, 40 (Mar. 2003) (opposing no-citation rules); Roy H. Wepner, Are Federal Appellate
Practitioners Free at Last? Proposed Rule Change Lifts Ban on Citation of Unpublished
Decisions that is Still in Effect in Certain Federal Appeals Courts, 175 N.J.L.J. 272
(2004) (opposing no-citation rules) with, e.g., Gregory S. Fisher, Citing to the
Unpublished Opinion, 40 ARIZ. ATT’Y 8, 8 (Feb. 2004) (opposing uniform rule
permitting citation) and Medford, White & Medford, supra note 23, at 27 (predicting that
the controversy is likely to continue until the United States Supreme Court addresses the
issue); Robert E. Shapiro, 29 LITIGATION 63, 65 (Fall 2002) (taking a middle ground by
urging courts not to issue written opinions except in cases that warrant them, and
suggesting that such opinions should be citable).
181
“All opinions reside somewhere on a continuum that moves from simple dispute
resolution to law-making and also on a rhetorical line that moves from informing to
persuading.” ELIZABETH FAJANS, MARY R. FALK & HELENE S. SHAPO, WRITING FOR LAW
PRACTICE 339 (2004); see id. at 334 (three primary functions of judicial writing are
dispute resolution, predictive guidance, and lawmaking); see also Weaver, supra note 46,
at 481. “Judicial opinions serve two basic purposes: (1) to settle the particular dispute
before the court, and (2) to establish the law that is used to decide other cases.” Id.
(citing Leflar, Sources of Judge Made Law, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 319, 319 (1971)).
182
Many commentators have referred to the “error-correcting” function of the
appellate courts. See, e.g., Jeffrey O. Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive Virtues and
Casual Vices in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 685, 712
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circuit’s written decision, absent further proceedings on appeal,
ultimately triggers issuance of the mandate183 to the lower court. The
mandate has the legal effect of ensuring that the circuit panel’s decision
is implemented by ordering certain action by the lower court from which
184
the appeal was taken.
If the district court’s decision is affirmed, it
185
If reversed, the panel
becomes final upon the issuance of the mandate.
may vacate the district court’s judgment or remand for further
186
proceedings before the district court.
In any further proceedings, the
written decision of the circuit panel embodies “the law of the case,” and
any subsequent rulings by the district court, and even the appellate court
on further appeal, must be consistent with the circuit’s initial written
187
decision.
The dispositive aspects of a circuit panel’s decision may also affect
future litigation between some or all of the same parties. A decision will
(2000/2001). However, in carrying out their primary function of resolving disputes, the
federal circuits do not simply correct errors. Under the harmless error doctrine, for
example, the appellate courts often affirm the result reached by the district court while
acknowledging that an error may have occurred. See, e.g., Hart v. Massanari, 20 Fed.
Appx. 668, 669, No. 99-56472, 2001 WL 1135601, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 2001)
(holding that any error by the administrative law judge in refusing to allow appellant to
comment on post-hearing reports was harmless). Even when the appellate court does
identify reversible error, the typical result is to remand for further proceedings. The
pragmatic function the appellate courts serve for the parties to the appeal is more
accurately characterized as dispositive. Whether errors are corrected or not, the decision
by the federal circuit court resolves the issues raised on appeal, either terminating the
litigation for all practical purposes, or by remanding to the trial court for further
proceedings. “For the litigants, dispute resolution is a decision’s most fundamental
purpose.” FAJANS, FALK & SHAPO, supra note 181, at 338.
183
A mandate is “[a]n order from an appellate court directing a lower court to take a
specified action,” or in the alternative, “[a] judicial command directed to an officer of the
court to enforce a court order.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 980 (8th ed. 2004).
184
See FED. R. APP. P. 41.
185
See id. Advisory Committee’s notes to 1998 amendments; see, e.g., Calderon v.
U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 128 F.3d 1283, 1286 n.2 (9th Cir. 1997) (“In
federal court . . . a judgment does not become final following appeal until the case is
returned to district court and the mandate is spread.”); see also 16A CHARLES A. WRIGHT,
ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
JURISDICTION AND OTHER MATTERS § 3987 (1999 & Supp. 2004) (noting that “[u]ntil the
mandate issues, . . . the case ordinarily remains within the jurisdiction of the court of
appeals and the district court lacks power to proceed further with respect to the matters
involved with the appeal”).
186
See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2106 (2005).
187
See, e.g., Briggs v. Penn. R. Co., 334 U.S. 304, 306 (1948) (reaffirming that “an
inferior court has no power or authority to deviate from the mandate issued by an
appellate court.”); see also 18B CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND OTHER MATTERS §
4478.3 (2002 & Supp. 2004). “Law-of-the-case terminology is often employed to express
the principle that an inferior tribunal is bound to honor the mandate of a superior court
within a single judicial system.” Id.
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have res judicata or collateral estoppel effect if one or more of the parties
to a legal dispute attempt to relitigate the same dispute in another forum
or at a later time. It is only for this limited dispositive purpose that all
188
In other words,
circuits allow citation of unpublished opinions.
whether an opinion is designated for publication or not, all federal courts
of appeals acknowledge that it may be cited for its dispositive value with
respect to the parties to the appeal.189
Second, a federal circuit decision serves a predictive function190
with respect to the likely outcome of other similar disputes pending
before the same court. All written decisions emanating from the federal
circuit provide an important basis from which attorneys predict how the
same or similar disputes will be resolved by that circuit. Whether
designated for publication or not, written opinions offer a window into
191
the thought processes of the judges who decided the issue.
Especially
in the absence of any precedential opinion directly on point, an
“unpublished” opinion offers the practicing bar a strong indication how
the judges who served on the panel, as well as their colleagues in the
192
same circuit, will analyze and decide similar cases in the future.
The
predictive function is the one most practicing attorneys assign to written
decisions of the federal circuits.193
Third, appellate court decisions serve an important lawmaking
function by shaping the bounds of the law itself, or by interpreting and
188
See Appendix I (table of current publication and citation rules for each federal
circuit).
189
Some circuit rules suggest that they are permitting such opinions to be cited for
their “precedential” value. However, the word “precedential” suggests that a rule of law
articulated in one case will be applied to another involving different parties. See BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY 1280 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “precedent” as “[a] decided case that
furnishes a basis for determining later cases involving similar facts or issues.”). Citing an
unpublished opinion for purposes of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the
case doctrine is more accurately described as a dispositive function.
190
FAJANS, FALK & SHAPO, supra note 181, at 338; see supra note 2.
191
See Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure to the Chief Justice of the United States and Members of the Judicial
Conference of the United States 11 (September 2004) (noting that lawyers, district court
judges, and appellate judges regularly read unpublished opinions despite local
prohibitions against citing them, and that unpublished opinions are helpful when
addressing recurring issues involving similar fact patterns), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/jc09-2004/JCReport.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
192
See Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions
and Government Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REV. 940,
947 (1989) (noting that even information about an individual judge may have value for
litigants).
193
See, e.g., Williams v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 256 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 2001)
(Smith, J., joined by Jones and DeMoss, JJ., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
“The law is supposed to inform the choices of potential litigants. How can this circuit’s
[unpublished] decisions do so, if they carry no predictive effect?” Id.
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applying a statute in the context of novel facts.194 The precedential effect
assigned to an appellate court decision directly controls the extent to
195
The
which it contributes to the body of law within the circuit.
lawmaking function of the federal circuits also extends to state law,
because decisions rendered in diversity and habeas corpus cases often
196
address novel state law issues.
While a federal circuit’s decision on an
issue of state law is not binding on state courts, as a practical matter it
does bind federal district courts within the same circuit with respect to
similar disputes, at least until the state appellate courts have had the
opportunity to address the issue.197
In some instances, because of the nature of the issue itself, the
federal courts may have numerous opportunities to address a novel issue
of state law without any intervening decisions by the state courts. When
that occurs, the federal circuits perform an important role in predicting
and shaping the contours of state law in the interim between precedential
198
state court decisions on the same issue.
Thus, even though a federal
circuit court decision on a matter of state law is non-binding on state
courts, the decision serves an important lawmaking function.

194

See Adam N. Steinman, A Constitution for Judicial Lawmaking, 65 U. PITT. L.
REV. 545, 553 (2004); ABA Comm’n on Standards of Judicial Administration,
STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.00, commentary, at 5 (1994) (noting
that one of the functions of the appellate courts is “to formulate and develop the law for
general application in the legal system”); see also Pearson, supra note 22, at 1262 (noting
that neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has clearly delineated the courts of appeals’
lawmaking function).
195
See Steinman, supra note 194, at 583.
A system where courts are free to decide cases knowing that the decision
will not bind them in the future could undermine the legitimacy of the court
by permitting arbitrary or unprincipled decisionmaking. The essence of
principled decisionmaking, arguably, is to base decisions on principles that
will hold fast beyond just the immediate case. Thus, allowing broad judicial
lawmaking can legitimate the judicial role, because it helps to ensure that
decisions are reached in a principled manner.
Id.
196
See, e.g., Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding
that a common law tort was committed under California law when defendants produced a
commercial using a deliberate imitation of a professional singer’s widely known,
distinctive voice); Keener v. Ridenour, 594 F.2d 581, 586-87 (6th Cir. 1979) (citing
several unpublished decisions of Ohio appellate courts in examining availability of
additional state law remedies in reviewing dismissal of habeas corpus petition).
197
Empirical research should be undertaken to determine whether the circuit courts
designate decisions in diversity cases as “unpublished” more or less frequently than they
do in non-diversity cases.
198
See, e.g., Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors, Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 957-58 (6th
Cir. 1980) (interpreting Tennessee law in a diversity case to hold that the exclusive right
to publicity does not survive a celebrity’s death).
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As compared to the judicial decision itself, the panel’s written
opinion in each case serves a different purpose.199 While the decision’s
primary purpose is to resolve the specific dispute presented to the
appellate court, the purpose of an opinion is to articulate the reasoning
the panel followed in reaching its decision – or at least the reasoning the
panel elects to state explicitly for the record.200 In the words of one
noted circuit judge, only through explanation can judges “reinforce our
oft-challenged and arguably shaky authority to tell others—including our
duly elected political leaders—what we do . . . . One of the few ways we
have to justify our power to decide matters important to our fellow
201
citizens is to explain why we decide as we do.”
In order to keep up with crushing dockets, federal appeals courts
have devised alternative methods of disposition to avoid the need to issue
a full opinion in every case. For example, many appellate courts have
adopted a “summary calendar” for cases in which oral argument is not
202
considered necessary.
Others use a “summary disposition” procedure
203
Unpublished
for issuing abbreviated decisions in certain cases.
opinions were devised for similar reasons – to reduce the workload on
each judge associated with preparing a full opinion in virtually every
204
case.
The degree to which each circuit makes use of procedures
205
designed to expedite the judicial workload varies considerably.
To the extent that the federal courts of appeals limit the use of these
alternative methods of disposition, including unpublished opinions, to
routine decisions not involving issues of first impression or novel fact
patterns, procedural rules limiting citation of those decisions should be
206
noncontroversial.
On the other hand, when appellate courts resort to
199

See Wright v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 278 F.3d 1245, 1255 (11th Cir. 2002). “A
judicial decision and a judicial opinion are not the same thing. The chief responsibility of
judges is to decide the case before them. They may, or may not, attempt to explain the
decision in an opinion.” Id.
200
Id.
201
Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial
Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1372; see FAJANS, FALK & SHAPO, supra note 181, at
342 (judicial obligation to write persuasive opinions explaining decision outcomes is a
“check on unbridled exercises of power”).
202
See, e.g., 5TH CIR. R. 34.2.
203
See, e.g., U.S. Court. of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, HANDBOOK OF PRACTICE AND
INTERNAL PROCEDURES 35-36 (2002), available at http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/
internet/internet.nsf/650f3eec0dfb990fca25692100069854/e4556c08772a8cec85256eb70
07149af/$FILE/finalhandbook2002.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
204
See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
205
See, e.g., Table S-3, supra note 5.
206
See Dean A. Morande, Comment, Publication Plans in the United States Courts of
Appeals: The Unattainable Paradigm, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 751, 758 (2004)
(hypothesizing that if the appellate courts followed their publication guidelines, the entire
debate would be moot).
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the use of unpublished decisions to address novel legal issues or apply
settled law to novel fact patterns, it should be no surprise when future
litigants seek to persuade the court to rely on those decisions, at least as
207
persuasive legal authority.
Several circuits’ local rules include guidelines for publication of
208
However, it has been questioned whether the federal courts
decisions.
207

E.g., Weaver, supra note 46, at 492 (advocating a rule allowing free citation of
unpublished opinions as persuasive authority).
Unpublished decisions are law as much as are published decisions for
dispute settling purposes. The application of the doctrines of res judicata,
law of the case, and collateral estoppel to unpublished opinions assures their
capacity to settle disputes. But unpublished opinions, because of their lack
of promulgation, are not precedents. They are not fit subjects for the
application of the doctrine of stare decisis. Yet, because the reasoning found
in unpublished decisions may be useful in establishing the law, their citation
should be allowed for that purpose.
Id. at 493; see Howard Slavitt, Selling the Integrity of The System of Precedent: Selective
Publication, Depublication, and Vacatur, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 109 (1995). “Even
if one accepts the private law model premise that the purpose of litigation is to resolve the
dispute between the parties, once a court issues a judgment the private dispute should be
thought of as public property.” Id. at 138; see also Vincent M. Cox, Note, Freeing
Unpublished Opinions from Exile: Going Beyond the Citation Permitted by Proposed
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1, 44 WASHBURN L.J. 105, 105 (2004) (some
lawyers advocate that unpublished opinions should be freely citable to the courts).
208
Id. at 759-64 (surveying publication plans in the federal courts of appeals); see,
e.g., 7TH CIR. R. 53(c), (d).
(c) Guidelines for Method of Disposition.
(1) Published Opinions. A published opinion will be filed when the
decision
(i) establishes a new, or changes an existing rule of law;
(ii) involves an issue of continuing public interest;
(iii) criticizes or questions existing law;
(iv) constitutes a significant and non-duplicative contribution
to legal literature
(A) by a historical review of law,
(B) by describing legislative history, or
(C) by resolving or creating a conflict in the law;
(v) reverses a judgment or denies enforcement of an order
when the lower court or agency has published an opinion
supporting the judgment or order; or
(vi) is pursuant to an order of remand from the Supreme Court
and is not rendered merely in ministerial obedience to specific
directions of that Court.
(2) Unpublished Orders. When the decision does not satisfy the criteria
for publication, as stated above, it will be filed as an unpublished order.
The order will ordinarily contain reasons for the judgment, but may not
do so if the court has announced its decision and reasons from the bench.
A statement of facts may be omitted from the order or may not be
complete or detailed.
(d) Determination of Whether Disposition is to be by Order or Opinion.
(1) The determination to dispose of an appeal by unpublished order shall
be made by a majority of the panel rendering the decision.
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of appeals uniformly comply with their own publication guidelines.
As a practical matter, as caseloads continue to increase, the federal
circuits have increasingly opted for nonpublication of their decisions in
210
significant numbers.
Empirical research suggests that limited
211
However,
publication rules are effective in reducing appellate delay.
the increasing numbers of unpublished decisions are not limited to
routine cases, as the circuits’ nonpublication guidelines and judicial
commentary would suggest. Instead, the data show that large numbers of
unpublished opinions are issued to resolve non-routine categories of
212
appeals.
It is no wonder, then, that no-citation rules are controversial.
Attorneys should not be threatened with sanctions for citing unpublished
opinions to the very courts that issue those decisions, especially when the
courts themselves fail to follow their own guidelines for determining
whether opinions warrant publication. If nonprecedential status were
reserved for truly routine decisions, no credible attorney would have any
reason to cite those opinions because they would have no persuasive
213
214
value.
The issue has become increasingly controversial because the
(2) The requirement of a majority represents the policy of this circuit.
Notwithstanding the right of a single federal judge to make an opinion
available for publication, it is expected that a single judge will ordinarily
respect and abide by the opinion of the majority in determining whether
to publish.
(3) Any person may request by motion that a decision by unpublished
order be issued as a published opinion. The request should state the
reasons why the publication would be consistent with the guidelines for
method of disposition set forth in this rule.
7TH CIR. R. 53(c), (d).
209
See Robert J. Van Der Velde, Quiet Justice: Unreported Opinions of the United
States Courts of Appeals – A Modest Proposal for Change, 35 COURT REVIEW 20, 26
(1998) (noting that data suggests that circuit policies regarding nonpublication are not
uniformly implemented); Morande, supra note 206, at 758 (hypothesizing that if the
appellate courts followed their guidelines for publication of decisions, the entire
“publication debate” would be moot).
210
Van Der Velde, supra note 209, at 20. In 1981, for example, slightly less than half
of all dispositions by the federal circuits were unpublished decisions. Id. at 22 (citing
Stienstra, supra note 8, at 40-41 && 40 tbl. 2). In 2003, 79.5 percent of all dispositions
were unpublished. See Table S-3, supra note 5.
211
Van Der Velde, supra note 209, at 24 & 51 tbl. 5 (comparing mean days pending
for published decisions as compared to unpublished decisions, by category; concluding
that for nearly every category, cases resolved by unpublished decisions were completed
in fewer days, on average, than those terminating in published decisions). “[S]ignificant
time savings occur through the use of limited publication plans by the appellate courts.
With each variable examined, unpublished cases were concluded more quickly than
published cases, and in some cases several months sooner.” Id. at 26.
212
Id. at 26-27.
213
“[A] lawyer who relies on an unpublished opinion in a brief or oral argument is in
effect acknowledging that no published opinion supports the lawyer’s position. That is a
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proportion of nonprecedential decisions issued by the courts of appeals
215
has increased dramatically over the last decade.
VII. ETHICAL DUTY OF CANDOR V. LOCAL NO-CITATION RULES
216

As an officer of the court, every attorney owes the tribunal an
ethical duty of candor.217 The duty of candor has been acknowledged as
substantial disincentive to promiscuous citation of unpublished rulings.” Unpublished
Judicial Opinions, supra note 60, at 53 (prepared statement of Arthur D. Hellman); see
also id. at 55 n.47 (“It is instructive to browse through a volume of the Federal Appendix.
The vast majority of the opinions have nothing in them that anyone would want to cite.”).
214
Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., chair of the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules,
anticipated the controversy as early as May 2002, when he received a “decidedly mixed
response” from his survey of circuit chief judges about the Justice Department’s proposal
to permit citation of unpublished opinions. See Memorandum to Judge Anthony J.
Scirica, Chair, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, from Judge
Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, at 3-4 (May 21,
2002), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/AP5-2002.pdf (last visited
Feb. 27, 2005); see also Memorandum to Judge Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, from Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair,
Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, at 2 (December 6, 2002) (reporting that the
Committee had in principle approved proposed FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 that would permit
citation of unpublished opinions, “a controversial matter” likely to generate substantial
comments), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/AP12-2002.pdf (last
visited Feb. 27, 2005).
215
See Table 1.6, supra note 5.
216
SHARSWOOD, supra note 94, at 83-84.
[T]he lawyer is not merely the agent of the party; he is an officer of the
court. The party has a right to have his case decided upon the law and the
evidence, and to have every view presented to the minds of the judges,
which can legitimately bear upon the question. This is the office which the
advocate performs. . . . The court or jury ought certainly to hear and weigh
both sides; and the office of counsel is to assist them by doing that, which
the client in person, from want of learning, experience, and address, is
unable to do in a proper manner.
Id.
217
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3: Candor Toward the Tribunal
(2001).
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is
necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;
(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling
jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of
the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel . . . .
(b) The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of the
proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information
otherwise protected by rule 1.6 [client confidentiality].
The amendments adopted by the ABA in November 2002 omitted the qualifying word
“material” from the prohibition against making false statements to a tribunal and
combined former subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2):
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
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paramount in numerous published opinions issued by federal courts of
appeals.218 In addition, an attorney is barred by various procedural rules
(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a
false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by
the lawyer;
(2) fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling
jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of
the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel . . . .
....
(c) The duties stated in paragraphs (a) and (b) continue to the conclusion of
the proceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of
information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6 [client confidentiality].
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3: Candor Toward the Tribunal (2002). The
commentary to the revised rule clarifies the applicability of the rule:
This Rule sets forth the special duties of lawyers as officers of the court to
avoid conduct that undermines the integrity of the adjudicative process. A
lawyer acting as an advocate in an adjudicative proceeding has an obligation
to present the client’s case with persuasive force. Performance of that duty
while maintaining confidences of the client, however, is qualified by the
advocate’s duty of candor to the tribunal.
Id. cmt. [2].
218
See, e.g., United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 1993).
[W]e are confident that a general duty of candor to the court exists in
connection with an attorney’s role as an officer of the court.
Our adversary system for the resolution of disputes rests on the
unshakable foundation that truth is the object of the system’s process which
is designed for the purpose of dispensing justice. However, because no one
has an exclusive insight into truth, the process depends on the adversarial
presentation of evidence, precedent and custom, and argument to reasoned
conclusions—all directed with unwavering effort to what, in good faith, is
believed to be true on matters material to the disposition. Even the slightest
accommodation of deceit or a lack of candor in any material respect quickly
erodes the validity of the process. As soon as the process falters in that
respect, the people are then justified in abandoning support for the system in
favor of one where honesty is preeminent.
While no one would want to disagree with these generalities about the
obvious, it is important to reaffirm, on a general basis, the principle that
lawyers, who serve as officers of the court, have the first line task of
assuring the integrity of the process. Each lawyer undoubtedly has an
important duty of confidentiality to his client and must surely advocate his
client’s position vigorously, but only if it is truth which the client seeks to
advance. The system can provide no harbor for clever devices to divert the
search, mislead opposing counsel or the court, or cover up that which is
necessary for justice in the end. It is without note, therefore, that we
recognize that the lawyer’s duties to maintain the confidences of a client and
advocate vigorously are trumped ultimately by a duty to guard against the
corruption that justice will be dispensed on an act of deceit. See 1 Geoffrey
C. Hazard, Jr. and W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering 575-76 (1990)
(‘[W]here there is danger that the tribunal will be misled, a litigating lawyer
must forsake his client’s immediate and narrow interests in favor of the
interests of the administration of justice itself.’).
While Rule 3.3 articulates the duty of candor to the tribunal as a
necessary protection of the decision-making process, see Hazard at 575, and
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from bringing frivolous appeals. For example, federal courts of appeals
have authority to impose sanctions upon determining that an appeal is
frivolous, after giving notice to the attorney and a reasonable opportunity
to respond.219 In addition, after reasonable notice and a hearing, if
requested, the federal circuits may impose discipline, including
suspension or disbarment, for “conduct unbecoming a member of the
court’s bar” or “failure to comply with any court rule.”220 Finally, an
attorney who submits a document to the court represents to the best of
his or her knowledge that the claims, defenses, and arguments presented
are “warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment

Rule 3.4 articulates an analogous duty to opposing lawyers, neither of these
rules nor the entire Code of Professional Responsibility displaces the
broader general duty of candor and good faith required to protect the
integrity of the entire judicial process.
Id. at 457-58 (emphasis added); see also Monee Nursery & Landscaping Co. v. Int’l
Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 150, AFL-CIO, 348 F.3d 671, 678 n.4 (7th Cir. 2003).
[A]n intentional misstatement of law before a court is a serious offense that
violates Rule 3.3(a) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“a lawyer
shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or law to a
tribunal”) and can lead to sanctions under Rule 11(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Id. at 678 n.4 (citing Teamsters Local No. 579 v. B & M Transit, Inc., 882 F.2d 274, 280
(7th Cir. 1989)); LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. First Conn. Holding Group, LLC, 287 F.3d 279,
293 (3d Cir. 2002) (“as an officer of the court, an attorney must comport himself/herself
with integrity and honesty when making representations regarding a matter in litigation”);
Amoco Oil Co. v. United States, 234 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“By failing to
cite controlling adverse authority, the conduct of appellant’s counsel was inappropriate
and potentially a violation of counsel’s duty of candor toward the court.”) (citing MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3)); United States v. Ogbonna, 184 F.3d 447, 449
n.2 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Attorneys are not to file or give aid in filing briefs that base their
arguments on case law contrary to binding Fifth Circuit precedent without mentioning the
binding precedent. Frivolous arguments are not to be made to this court.”) (citing FED. R.
APP. P. 38); Transamerica Leasing, Inc v. Compania Anonima Venezolana de
Navegacion, 93 F.3d 675, 675-76 (9th Cir. 1996). “Rule 3.3(a)(3) prohibits an attorney
from knowingly failing to disclose controlling authority directly adverse to the position
advocated. The rule is an important one, especially in the district courts, where its faithful
observance by attorneys assures that judges are not the victims of lawyers hiding the legal
ball.” Id.; see also Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092 (11th Cir. 1994).
Every lawyer is an officer of the court. . . . [I]n addition to his duty of
diligently researching his client’s case, he always has a duty of candor to the
tribunal. . . . The duty of candor goes beyond the moral duty imposed on
counsel by ethical codes or good conscience.
Id. at 1095 & n.5; In re Hendrix, 986 F.2d 195, 201 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, J.) (while
federal circuits are divided as to “whether failure to acknowledge binding adverse
precedent violates FED. R. CIV. P. 11,” knowing concealment of dispositive adverse
authority amounts to professional misconduct contrary to Rule 3.3(a)(3) (1983)).
219
See FED. R. APP. P. 38.
220
FED. R. APP. P. 46(b), (c).
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of new law . . . .”221 Rule 11 specifically permits the court to take the
initiative to impose sanctions for violations by issuing an order
describing the challenged conduct and directing counsel to show cause
222
why the conduct did not violate the rule.
Beyond the procedural and ethical rules expressly conferring
sanctioning power, the United States Supreme Court has expressly
declared that the federal courts have the inherent power, “incidental to all
[c]ourts,” to discipline attorneys appearing before them.223 In addition,
it is firmly established that “[t]he power to punish for contempts
is inherent in all courts.” This power reaches both conduct
before the court and that beyond the court's confines, for “[t]he
underlying concern that gave rise to the contempt power was not
. . . merely the disruption of court proceedings. Rather, it was
disobedience to the orders of the Judiciary, regardless of whether
such disobedience interfered with the conduct of trial.”224

The attorney’s duty of candor to the court outweighs even the
attorney’s ethical duties to the client.225 “As officers of the court,
lawyers who practice in federal court have an obligation to assist the
judges to keep within the boundaries fixed by the Constitution and
Congress; it is precisely to impose a duty of assistance on the bar that
lawyers are called ‘officers of the court.’”226 Whether embodied in
statute, procedural rules, or disciplinary rules, the duty of candor and
honesty to the tribunal is deeply rooted in American jurisprudence.227
221
FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2). The rule also authorizes the imposition of appropriate
sanctions for violations of subsection (b). See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c).
222
See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1)(B); see, e.g., Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1159
(9th Cir. 2001) (ordering appellant’s counsel to show cause why he should not be
sanctioned for violating Ninth Circuit’s no-citation rule).
223
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991) (citing Ex parte Burr, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 529, 531 (1824)); see, e.g., Byrne v. Nezhat, 261 F.3d 1075, 1106 (11th Cir.
2001) (quoting Chambers).
224
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44 (citations omitted).
225
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(c) (2002); see, e.g., Cleveland Hair
Clinic, Inc. v. Puig, 200 F.3d 1063, 1067 (7th Cir. 2000) (attorney’s duties to protect
client confidentiality and advocate vigorously are qualified by the duty to be honest with
the court).
226
BEM I, L.L.C. v. Anthropologie, Inc., 301 F.3d 548, 551 (7th Cir. 2002).
227
See EDWARD ABBOTT PARRY, THE SEVEN LAMPS OF ADVOCACY (1923).
The best advocates of all generations have been advocates of honesty.
Abraham Lincoln founded his fame and success in the profession on what
some called his “perverse honesty.” On his first appearance in the Supreme
Court of Illinois he addressed the court as follows: “This is the first case I
have ever had in this court, and I have therefore examined it with great care.
As the court will perceive by looking at the abstract of the record, the only
question in the case is one of authority. I have not been able to find any
authority to sustain my side of the case, but I have found several cases
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Local rules prohibiting or discouraging the citation of legal
authority of any kind directly contradict the attorney’s duty of candor.
The courts have made it very clear that an attorney has an overarching
228
duty to protect the integrity of the judicial system, and yet that very
system, through the enforcement of local rules discouraging citation of
unpublished opinions, threatens to sanction attorneys who act in good
faith to bring relevant legal authority to the attention of the court. If the
federal courts of appeals mean what they say—that an attorney’s ethical
duty of candor to the court overrides even the ethical duty of loyalty to
the client—then the federal judiciary must remove the practicing bar
from the horns of the ethical dilemma: Comply with the duty of candor
and risk sanctions for violating local no-citation rules? Or comply with
local no-citation rules and violate the duty of candor to the court?
No-citation rules put attorneys in a double bind: If appellate
counsel conscientiously abides by the duty of candor to the tribunal, the
attorney risks the imposition of sanctions by that very court for citing
opinions designated as “unpublished,” in violation of the rules of the
229
court and the ethical rules requiring attorneys to follow them.
On the
other hand, if appellate counsel abides by local rules that prohibit or
disfavor the citation of “unpublished” opinions, the attorney risks the
imposition of sanctions for violating the ethical duty of candor, the
requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, the obligations on appellate counsel
set forth in Fed. R. App. P. 46, and the duty to competently represent the
230
client.

directly in point on the other side. I will now give these authorities to the
court, and then submit the case.” . . . . If an advocate knows the law to be x,
it is not honest to lead the court to believe that it is y. Whether the advocate
does this by directly mis-stating the law, or by deliberately omitting to state
it fully within the means of his knowledge, it is equally without excuse, and
dims the lamp of honesty.
For the advocate must remember that he is not only the servant of the
client, but the friend of the court, and honesty is as essential to true
friendship as it is to sound advocacy.
Id. at 19-20 (emphasis added).
228
“The general duty of candor and truth thus takes its shape from the larger object of
preserving the integrity of the judicial system.” United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11
F.3d 450, 458 (4th Cir. 1993).
229
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(C) (2002), which reads as follows:
A lawyer shall not:. . .
(c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for
an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists[.]
Id.; see also ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 94-386R
(1995).
230
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2002).
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The federal circuit courts have repeatedly echoed the words of the
231
Fourth Circuit in United States v. Shaffer Equipment Company:
Our adversary system for the resolution of disputes rests on the
unshakable foundation that truth is the object of the system's
process which is designed for the purpose of dispensing justice.
However, because no one has an exclusive insight into truth, the
process depends on the adversarial presentation of evidence,
precedent and custom, and argument to reasoned conclusions—
all directed with unwavering effort to what, in good faith, is
believed to be true on matters material to the disposition. Even
the slightest accommodation of deceit or a lack of candor in any
material respect quickly erodes the validity of the process. As
soon as the process falters in that respect, the people are then
justified in abandoning support for the system in favor of one
232
where honesty is preeminent.

Yet ironically, the Fourth Circuit’s local rule, as well as those of
most other federal circuits, discourages attorneys from telling the “whole
233
truth” to the court if it means citing its own unpublished opinions.
No-citation rules are simply antithetical to the expressed values of the
federal circuit courts favoring attorney conduct that protects the integrity
234
of the judicial system.

231
Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 1993); see also supra note 218 and
accompanying text.
232
Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d at 457.
233
4TH CIR. R. 36(c). However, the Fourth Circuit’s local rule does permit citation of
unpublished opinions in limited circumstances:
Citation of this Court’s unpublished dispositions in briefs and oral
arguments in this Court and in the district courts within this Circuit is
disfavored, except for the purpose of establishing res judicata, estoppel, or
the law of the case. If counsel believes, nevertheless, that an unpublished
disposition of this court has precedential value in relation to a material issue
in a case and that there is no published opinion that would serve as well,
such disposition may be cited if counsel serves a copy thereof on all other
parties in the case and on the Court.
Id.; see Appendix I.
234
See Slavitt, supra note 207, at 142.
As precedent, [a federal judge’s] ideas and reasoning are society’s property.
The system of precedent preserves the reasoning of prevailing as well as
losing arguments so that future courts can continue to reason through and to
revise the applicable rules. While separate opinions may not always lead to
changes in the majority viewpoint, a majority rule’s ability to withstand
contrary reasoning adds to its validity. It is the reliance on tradition and the
equal opportunity of litigants to influence this tradition that provides judicial
legitimacy in a political democracy. It is a question of priorities, of how
highly we value precedent when calculating the most “efficient” distribution
of resources. The courts cannot afford to ignore efficiency, but at the same
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VIII. PROPOSED FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1:
A SOLUTION STALLED BY STUDY
The proposed new Rule 32.1 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure represents the culmination of years of debate about the
propriety of no-citation rules. From the very beginning, proposals to
develop nonpublication plans and no-citation rules were controversial.
In 2001, in the aftermath of the constitutional debate concerning the
precedential value of unpublished opinions, the Solicitor General of the
Department of Justice proposed adoption of a new federal rule of
235
appellate practice.
In April 2002, the Advisory Committee on
Appellate Rules endorsed the proposal in concept, with some
236
In November 2003, the Advisory Committee issued a
modifications.
proposed new rule for public comment. 237 If approved, Rule 32.1 would
time judicial integrity is an intangible. An equation cannot adequately
measure the costs of selling the integrity of the system of precedent.
Id. (internal footnotes omitted).
235
See Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure to the Chief Justice of the United States and Members of the Judicial
Conference of the United States 9 (September 2004), available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/rules/jc09-2004/JCReport.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005). “In January
2001, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the Department of Justice, proposed specific
language amending the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to provide for uniform
procedures governing the citation of unpublished opinions. The [Advisory] [C]ommittee
[on Appellate Rules] is now studying the Justice Department proposal.” Unpublished
Judicial Opinions, supra note 60, at 7 (prepared statement of Samuel A. Alito, Jr.); see
also id. at 9 (summarizing Department of Justice proposal); id. at 54 (prepared statement
of Arthur D. Hellman).
236
Memorandum to Judge Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure, from Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Committee on
Appellate Rules 3-4 (May 21, 2002), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/Reports/AP5-2002.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
237
As issued for public comment, proposed FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 read as follows:
Rule 32.1. Citation of Judicial Dispositions
(a) Citation Permitted. No prohibition or restriction may be imposed upon
the citation of judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written
dispositions that have been designated as “unpublished,” “not for
publication,” “non-precedential,” “not precedent,” or the like, unless that
prohibition or restriction is generally imposed upon the citation of all
judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions.
(b) Copies Required. A party who cites a judicial opinion, order, judgment,
or other written disposition that is not available in a publicly accessible
electronic database must file and serve a copy of that opinion, order,
judgment, or other written disposition with the brief or other paper in which
it is cited.
Memorandum to Judge Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure, from Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory Committee on
Appellate Rules, at 2-3 (May 22, 2003), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
rules/Reports/AP5-2003.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005) (proposing to add new Rule 32.1
“that would require courts to permit the citation of judicial opinions, orders, judgments,
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prohibit any circuit from restricting citation of opinions designated as
“‘unpublished,’ ‘nonprecedential,’ or the like” to any greater extent than
restrictions imposed on the citation of other opinions issued by the
circuit.238
The new rule would permit citation of unpublished dispositions in
all federal circuits. As proposed, the rule would not require any circuit to
give precedential or even persuasive value to any unpublished opinion;
as a practical matter the new rule would simply remove the threat of
sanctions for attorneys who cite unpublished opinions in appellate briefs
and oral arguments.239 By doing so, proposed Rule 32.1, while limited,
is a step in the right direction. The practicing bar should not continue to
shoulder the risk of sua sponte enforcement of nonuniform local rules
governing citation of unpublished opinions that contradict longstanding
normative principles underlying the American judicial system—candor

and honesty in advocacy.

The Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules has wisely rejected
proposed amendments that would dilute the effect of the proposed
240
rule.
One such amendment would have given the rule only
prospective effect, thus allowing circuit courts to continue enforcing nocitation rules for unpublished decisions issued prior to the effective date
241
of the new rule.
Another would have permitted circuits to retain local
242
rules disfavoring citation of unpublished opinions.
Both suggested
amendments would have undermined the Committee’s purpose for
243
proposing the new rule in the first place.
Despite earlier indications of support, the Standing Committee
apparently had a change of heart when the Advisory Committee’s
recommendation was considered at the June 2004 meeting. In its
or other written dispositions that have been designated as ‘unpublished,’
‘non-precedential,’ or the like”).
238
Id. However, on April 14, 2004, the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules
amended the proposed rule to omit the “unless” clause in subsection (a) referring to
restrictions imposed on the citation of other opinions issued by the circuit. See Minutes of
April 13-14, 2004, Meeting of Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, Washington,
D.C., at 12, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/app0404.pdf (last visited
Feb. 27, 2005).
239
See Wepner, supra note 180, at 273. “Presumably, the committee is suggesting that
while unpublished appellate decisions normally are not quite as elegant as Shakespearean
sonnets, they just might be more on point.” Id.
240
See supra note 74; see also Minutes of April 13-14, 2004, Meeting of Advisory
Committee on Appellate Rules, Washington, D.C., at 9-11, available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/app0404.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
241
See Minutes of April 13-14, 2004, Meeting of Advisory Committee on Appellate
Rules, Washington, D.C., at 9-11, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/
app0404.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
242
Id.
243
Id.
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September 2004 report to the Judicial Conference, the Standing
Committee stopped short of approving the proposed new rule pending
244
the outcome of an empirical study.
Several courts of appeals have expressed concerns with some
aspects of the proposed rule. These concerns are mainly centered
on the belief that permitting citation of nonprecedential opinions
will significantly increase the workload of the courts. In
response to that increase, these courts predict that time to
disposition will increase as will the number of summary
judgment [sic] orders. These concerns can be tested empirically
in the nine circuits that now permit citation. In an effort to reach
a greater consensus among the courts, and in deference to the
circuits that oppose the proposed rule, the Committee decided to
defer approving the proposed new rule in favor of such an
empirical study. The Committee concluded that some further
consideration by the advisory committee would be helpful once
the empirical study was completed. This further consideration
would take into account the results of the empirical study but
need not be limited to empirical issues. The Committee was
particularly interested in the advisory committee's further
consideration of the application of the proposed rule to state court
unpublished opinions. The Committee was careful to state that
its action was neutral and should not be understood to express
245
disapproval of the proposal.

The Standing Committee’s failure to recommend approval of Rule
32.1 to the Judicial Conference is disappointing. After three years of
246
debate, the considered and well-documented opinion of the Advisory
244
See generally Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice
and Procedure to the Chief Justice of the United States and Members of the Judicial
Conference of the United States 7-13 (September 2004), available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/rules/jc09-2004/JCReport.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
245
Id. at 13.
246
The Justice Department initially recommended a new rule permitting citation of
unpublished opinions in January 2001. See supra note 235. At its April 2002 meeting, the
Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules discussed the proposal and indicated that it
favored such a rule. See Memorandum to Judge Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, from Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair,
Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, at 3-4 (May 21, 2002), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/AP5-2002.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005). At its
November 2002 meeting, the Committee considered three alternative versions of the
proposed new rule. See Memorandum to Judge Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, from Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair,
Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules, at 35 (December 6, 2002), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/AP12-2002.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005). After
lengthy discussion, id. at 34-39, the Committee voted 7-1, with one abstention, to
approve Alternative B in substance, with certain revisions. Id. at 39. A year later, in
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Committee on Appellate Rules was to recommend adoption of the new
247
Testimony presented at the public hearing on April 13, 2004,
rule.
repeatedly demonstrated that the nine circuits that do not prohibit citation
of unpublished opinions have not experienced the dire consequences
248
predicted by the opponents of the proposed rule.
While empirical
August 2003, proposed FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 and accompanying comments were
published for public comment. See Summary of the Report of the Judicial Conference
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 3-4 (September 2003), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ST9-2003.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005). Finally,
on April 14, 2004, the Advisory Committee recommended adoption of the new rule with
one modification. See Memorandum to Judge David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Committee
on Rules of Practice and Procedure, from Judge Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Chair, Advisory
Committee on Appellate Rules, at 1-2, 42-127 (May 14, 2004) (including Committee’s
recommended rule and advisory committee notes and a summary of all public comments
on the proposal), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/AP5-2004.pdf (last
visited Feb. 27, 2005).
247
See Minutes of April 13-14, 2004, Meeting of Advisory Committee on Appellate
Rules, Washington, D.C., at 11, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/
app0404.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
248
See Transcript of 2004 Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 68. For example,
Judge Bright, a senior judge on the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, testified as follows
in response to questions from the Committee Chair:
JUDGE ALITO: Thank you very much, Judge Bright. Let me ask you a
question to start out that draws on your unique experience of having sat with
so many different circuits. I don’t think any of our other witnesses has had
that experience. You’ve sat with circuits that prohibit the citation of
unpublished opinions, circuits that have no prohibition, circuits that limit the
citation to certain circumstances, I guess including your own circuit.
I wondered if you have noticed any effect that these local rules have had
on either the work of the lawyers or the work of the judges. We’ve had
conflicting comments from a variety of commenters. We’ve had those
who’ve predicted that if Rule 32.1 is adopted many very serious adverse
consequences will occur. We’ve had others who’ve said that if you look to
the experiences of the circuits that do not prohibit the citation of
unpublished opinions, there’s really very little evidence, if any, that this has
had any major effect either on the work of the lawyers or on the work of the
courts. And I wondered whether you have noticed that in the circuits where
the citation of unpublished opinions is allowed that when you are preparing
for an argument you have been burdened with a great many citations to
unpublished opinions that don’t seem to be well written or well reasoned
and whether this has materially, the knowledge that the opinion will be
citable when you’re writing an unpublished opinion, has made the process
of producing the opinion much more burdensome than it is in the circuits
that prohibit their citation.
JUDGE BRIGHT: I’m glad to answer that question. I’m going to focus it
right on [the Third] circuit because I’ve been sitting there for a long time,
even before Judge Becker was chief, and he and I have been close friends.
I have to say in all honesty there really doesn’t seem to be any
difference. I’ve sat on the Third Circuit. There may have been some
unpublished opinions that have been cited. I can’t remember them and I
didn’t pay any attention to them if I could. And the same goes in every one
of the circuits—even the Eighth Circuit, the same.
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research is a commendable idea in order to determine the administrative
consequences of adopting the proposed new rule, to delay its approval
pending the results of such a study is to give credence to the flawed
reasoning that led to adoption of no-citation rules thirty years ago. As
the Advisory Committee concluded after reviewing some 500 written
comments and hearing testimony at its day-long public hearing, whatever
problems unpublished opinions may cause, local rules that “gag
249
attorneys” are not the proper way to deal with the issue.
It is unclear how the empirical study proposed by the Standing
Committee will be conducted. Presumably the study will be carried out
by the Federal Judicial Center, the research arm of the federal judicial
250
system.
Even after the empirical research is completed, however, the
Standing Committee anticipates “further consideration” by the Advisory
Committee on Appellate Rules, which is likely to result in further
251
significant delays.
In addition, the Standing Committee’s report
suggests that the Advisory Committee need not limit its “further
252
consideration” to the results of the empirical study.
In particular, the Standing Committee has expressed interest in the
Advisory Committee's “further consideration of the application of the
253
proposed rule to state court unpublished opinions.”
This comment is
somewhat puzzling. Surely, in the interest of comity, the proposed
federal rule could not require state appellate courts to allow citation of
But there’s a difference and the big difference is this. Right now every
one of the circuits has a warning—we don’t want to hear unpublished
opinions but you can cite it if really it’s persuasive, something like the
Eighth Circuit. That’s true, I think, in almost all the circuits. It’s certainly
true in the circuits where I’ve sat and they allow publication.
But if you’re going to make it a level playing field with this new rule,
there’s no longer [going] to be the deterrence. Sure, the court can say we
don’t like you to cite them but the rule says you can, but [proposed Rule
32.1] is going to put nonpublished and published opinions as far as being in
the briefs on the same level. And if I were sure that it wouldn’t make any
difference I’d say go ahead, but I am not sure. I really think if you open the
doors, you’re going to cause a problem. And if it isn’t a problem today, let’s
not change it.
Id. at 19-22.
249
Minutes of April 13-14, 2004, Meeting of Advisory Committee on Appellate
Rules, Washington, D.C., at 8, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Minutes/
app0404.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
250
See supra note 55 (describing the history and mission of the Federal Judicial
Center).
251
See Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure to the Chief Justice of the United States and Members of the Judicial
Conference of the United States 13 (September 2004), available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/rules/jc09-2004/JCReport.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
252
Id.
253
Id.
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unpublished opinions. What the Standing Committee must be suggesting
instead is further consideration of the effects of prohibiting federal courts
of appeals from restricting citation of unpublished state court opinions.
The rule as proposed does not single out federal unpublished opinions,
nor should it. When a federal court of appeals considers a question of
state law in a diversity case, all pertinent legal authority, whether
published or not, should be citable to the appellate court as well as to the
district court that considered the state law question in the first
254
instance.
The Standing Committee’s report to the Judicial Conference
emphasized that “its action was neutral and should not be understood to
255
express disapproval of the proposal.”
Nevertheless, the Committee’s
inaction speaks louder than its words. Although the Standing Committee
expressed support for the proposed new rule at its January 2004 meeting,
its most recent failure to approve the proposed new rule demonstrates its
256
capitulation to controversy.
The Standing Committee’s decision to
withhold approval of proposed Rule 32.1 means that an indefinite
number of years will elapse before the ethical dilemmas posed by nocitation rules can be resolved. Notwithstanding the Committee’s weak
attempt to clarify its intent, its failure to approve Rule 32.1 has exactly
the same effect as a decision not to approve it. The ethical dilemmas for
the federal bar posed by restrictive citation rules thus continue, with no
end in sight.
IX. THE E-GOVERNMENT ACT OF 2002
Even if “unpublished” decisions issued by the federal appellate
courts ever once existed, any remaining vestige of that misnomer ended
abruptly on December 17, 2004. On that date, the E-Government Act of
2002257 (Act) took effect. The Act requires all federal circuits to
254

See supra text accompanying notes 196-98 (discussing federal courts’ lawmaking
role with respect to state law issues).
255
Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
to the Chief Justice of the United States and Members of the Judicial Conference of the
United States 13 (September 2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/jc092004/JCReport.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
256
See id. “In an effort to reach a greater consensus among the courts, and in
deference to the circuits that oppose the proposed rule, the [Standing] Committee decided
to defer approving the proposed new rule in favor of . . . an empirical study.” Id.
257
Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205(f), 116 Stat. 2899, 2915 (2002). The Act provides that
not later than two years after Dec. 17, 2002, the effective date of Title II, §§ 201-16, 116
Stat. 2910, the websites required by section 205(a) shall be established. Each website
must contain certain information, or links to websites providing the information,
specifically including: “(5) Access to the substance of all written opinions issued by the
court, regardless of whether such opinions are to be published in the official court
reporter, in a text searchable format.” Pub. L. 107-347, § 205(f) (emphasis added). In
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electronically publish, on their respective websites, every written opinion
issued after the effective date of the Act, whether or not the decision has
258
Thus, any
been designated for publication in the official reporter.
remaining arguments that “unpublished” opinions are not accessible to
litigants at little or no cost have been rendered moot as a matter of law.259
The pertinent language of the Act reads as follows:
(a) INDIVIDUAL COURT WEBSITES. -- The Chief Justice of
the United States, the chief judge of each circuit and district and
of the Court of Federal Claims, and the chief bankruptcy judge of
each district shall cause to be established and maintained, for the
court of which the judge is chief justice or judge, a website that
contains the following information or links to websites with the
following information:
....
(5) Access to the substance of all written opinions issued by the
court, regardless of whether such opinions are to be published in
the official court reporter, in a text searchable format.
....
(b) MAINTENANCE OF DATA ONLINE.-....

addition, the Act requires that all written opinions issued after December 17, 2004, the
effective date of section 205, must remain available online. Id. § 205(b)(2).
258
See id. § 205(f).
259
Elizabeth J. Pawlak, a Washington, D.C. patent attorney, put it bluntly in her
prepared testimony on proposed FED. R. APP. P. 32.1: “[A]ny reference to dispositions
that have been designated ‘unpublished’ or ‘not for publication’ in Subdivision (a) of the
Rule makes a mockery of Section 205 of the e-Government Act of 2002.” Supplemental
Remarks of Elizabeth J. Pawlak, Public Hearing on Proposed Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure Before the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules,
Judicial Conference of the United States (April 13, 2004), available at
http://www.secretjustice.org/pdf_files/Comments/Pawlak_statement.pdf (last visited Feb.
27, 2005); see also Pearson, supra note 22, at 129.
Congress recently passed a law that requires all federal appellate courts to
make unpublished decisions available over the Internet. In addition, in 2001
West Publishing Company introduced the Federal Appendix, a “published
reporter of unpublished opinions,” further weakening concerns of unequal
access to unpublished decisions are weakened. If all litigants now have
reasonable access to unpublished decisions, the no-citation rule is not
necessary to prevent unfairness.
Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
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(2) CLOSED CASES.-- Electronic files and docket information
for cases closed for more than 1 year are not required to be made
available online, except all written opinions with a date of
issuance after the effective date of this section shall remain
available online.
....
TIME REQUIREMENTS.-- Not later than 2 years after the
effective date of this title [Pub.L. 107-347, Title II, §§ 201 to
216, Dec. 17, 2002, 116 Stat. 2910] the websites under
subsection (a) shall be established, except that access to
documents filed in electronic form shall be established not later
260
than 4 years after that effective date.

Thus, Congress has mandated that all opinions issued by the federal
courts of appeals on or after December 17, 2004, shall be available
261
The key language in the
indefinitely online, in text-searchable format.
Act requires that public access to opinions must be provided on the
courts’ websites “regardless of whether such opinions are to be published
262
in the official court reporter.”
By extending the E-Government Act of
2002 to the courts, Congress has effectively trumped the efforts of the
federal judiciary to keep under wraps eighty percent of the opinions
issued by federal courts of appeals.
It has been predicted that the increasing availability of government
information on public domain websites will lead to “the presumption of
knowledge of their contents . . . and the expectation of lawyers’ higher
skill and ability to use these sites for research.”263 The general public,
for the first time in history, has a feasible means of direct access to
government information “at a level previously found only among the
most skilled legal researchers.”264 Indeed, as one state appellate court
has acknowledged, “[W]e see no reason why a government Internet site
should not be considered as much an official government document as
any printed pamphlet or other materials. Internet sites are available to
the general public, as much or more than a document or book in a law
library.”265
260

E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205, 116 Stat. 2899, 2913-15.
Id. § 205(a)(5), (b)(2), 116 Stat. 2899, 2913.
262
Id. § 205(a)(5), 116 Stat. 2899, 2913.
263
MacLachlan, supra note 45, at 644.
264
Id. at 645.
265
Id. (quoting Nat’l Info. Servs., Inc. v. Gottsegen, 737 So. 2d 909, 916 n.1 (La. Ct.
App. 1999) (taking judicial notice of an index of interest rate changes posted on a federal
government website)). On several occasions, federal courts of appeals have also taken
judicial notice of factual information available to the public on government websites. See
261
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Assuming that federal appellate courts will similarly acknowledge
the availability of their own opinions on government websites, the ethical
implications for attorneys give one pause. For example, attorneys will be
deemed to have constructive knowledge of opinions posted on the federal
courts’ own websites, just as they are presently deemed to have
constructive notice of precedential decisions. Thus, one of the necessary
elements of the duty to disclose adverse legal authority (“known to the
attorney”) will have been met. The ABA Model Rules of Professional
Conduct require an attorney to disclose authority in the controlling
jurisdiction known to the attorney to be directly adverse to his client’s
position.266
If threatened with sanctions for failing to cite adverse unpublished
legal authority that is accessible on a court of appeals website, an
attorney would be left to argue either (1) that he or she had no actual
knowledge of the opinion even though it was posted on a government
website in accordance with federal statute; (2) that the unpublished
opinion cannot be considered “authority”; or (3) that he or she did not
interpret the opinion to be “directly adverse” to the client’s position. No
longer can an attorney defend the imposition of sanctions on the basis
that the “unpublished” opinion itself is not meaningfully and equally
accessible to the litigants.
X. THE CONTINUING FICTION OF “UNPUBLISHED”
OPINIONS: A REPRISE
Federal circuit local rules that prohibit attorneys from citing the
great majority of the court’s decisions effectively impose a gag order on
the federal bar.267 The effect of these rules is to threaten appellate
counsel with sanctions simply for advising the court what the state of the
law is in that circuit – consistent with Jeremy Bentham’s notion of what
the cases actually decide, whether or not the decisions are published in
Coleen M. Barger, On the Internet, Nobody Knows You’re a Judge: Appellate Courts’
Use of Internet Materials, 4 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 417, 432 & n.45 (2002) (citing
cases from the Second, Fourth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits).
266
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(2) (2002).
267
See Testimony of William T. Hangley, American College of Trial Lawyers,
Transcript of 2004 Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 68, at 223-24 (suggesting
that the fact that the authoring tribunal does not want to show less than its very best work
is “a paltry excuse for gagging trial lawyers and their clients”); see William T. Hangley,
Prepared Testimony on Behalf of the American College of Trial Lawyers with Respect to
Proposed FED. R. APP. P. 32.1, submitted to the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules
(April
13,
2004),
at
4,
available
at
http://www.nonpublication.com/
Hangley_testimony.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005) (“[T]hat the rulemaking tribunal does
not want to risk being embarrassed by one of its less-than-optimally vetted holdings . . . is
a paltry excuse for gagging lawyers and their clients.”).
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reporters with the court’s sanction.268 In the words of Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., the law is what the courts “do in fact.”269 To suggest
otherwise by insisting that judicial lawmaking is embodied only in
opinions the judges themselves endorse as “precedential” is to maintain a
legal fiction270 of the worst kind.271
In truth, “unpublished” opinions have never existed, except in the
rare instances when a written decision is filed under seal to protect the
privacy of the litigants. In at least some circuits, copies of written
decisions are distributed not only to counsel of record, but also to district
272
judges, circuit judges, subscribers, and law libraries.
Copies of all
opinions, whether or not designated for “publication” or “precedential”

268

See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
270
“Legal fiction” is defined as: “[a]n assumption that something is true even though
it may be untrue, made esp[ecially] in judicial reasoning to alter how a legal rule
operates; specif[ically], a device by which a legal rule or institution is diverted from its
original purpose to accomplish indirectly some other object . . . .” BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 913 (8th ed. 2004). “‘Legal fiction is the mask that progress must wear to
pass the faithful but blear-eyed watchers of our ancient legal treasures. But though legal
fictions are useful in thus mitigating or absorbing the shock of innovation, they work
havoc in the form of intellectual confusion.’” Id. (quoting Morris R. Cohen, LAW AND
THE SOCIAL ORDER 126 (1933)).
271
In discussing the use of “forced falsehoods” in the law, Jeremy Bentham wrote:
To what a state of debility and depravation must the understanding of that
man have been brought down, who can really persuade himself that a
lawyer’s fiction is anything better than a lie of the very worst sort—that the
whole mass taken together, or any one particle of it, was ever of any the
smallest use to justice!
Fiction may be applied to a good purpose, as well as to a bad one; in
giving support to a useful rule or institution, as well as to a pernicious one.
The virtues of a useful institution will not be destroyed by any lie or lies that
may have accompanied the establishment of it; but can they receive any
increase? The virtues of a useful medicine will not be destroyed by
pronouncing an incantation over it before it is taken; but will they be
increased?
Behold here one of the artifices of lawyers. They refuse to administer
justice to you unless you join with them in their fictions; and then their cry
is, see how necessary fiction is to justice! Necessary indeed; but too
necessary; but how came it so, and who made it so?
As well might the father of a family make it a rule never to let his
children have their breakfast till they had uttered, each of them, a certain
number of lies, curses, and profane oaths; and then exclaim, “You see, my
dear children, how necessary lying, cursing, and swearing are to human
sustenance!”
Jeremy Bentham, THE THEORY OF FICTIONS 149-50 app. A, reprinted in C.K. Ogden,
BENTHAM’S THEORY OF FICTIONS (1932).
272
Stienstra, supra note 8, at 15-21, 41, 51-59 & Tables 5, 6; see Weaver, supra note
46, at 480.
269

2005]

LEGAL FICTION OF THE UNPUBLISHED KIND

91

status, have always been available upon request, for a nominal fee, from
273
the office of the clerk of the circuit court.
When a court prohibits attorneys in subsequent appeals from even
acknowledging the existence of eighty percent or more of the written
274
decisions issued by that court,
something is very wrong with our
judicial process. On the one hand, attorneys practicing in every
jurisdiction have an ethical duty of candor to the court.275 At minimum,
the duty of candor requires an attorney to advise the court about
“authority in the controlling jurisdiction” that is directly adverse to the
attorney’s position, at least if opposing counsel does not cite it first.276
Further, an attorney owes an ethical duty to the client to provide
277
competent representation.
In stark contradiction to the ethical rules governing all appellate
counsel, no-citation rules preclude attorneys from citing what may be the
best authorities supporting the client’s cause, simply because the panel
that authored the decision believed at the time that it had no precedential
value. Arbitrary and inconsistent local rules that bar attorneys from
citing what they believe to be the most cogent authorities, solely because
they have been designated as nonprecedential by the issuing panel, send
all the wrong messages to appellate counsel and their clients.
The rationale underlying the earliest “no-citation” rules, that
“unpublished” opinions were not fairly accessible by all litigants, has
long since disintegrated into cyberspace. Internet technology now allows
virtually anyone access to every circuit court opinion, at nominal or no
cost. By enacting the E-Government Act of 2002 and extending it to the
federal courts of appeals, Congress has exercised its statutory authority
to regulate judicial procedure regarding public access to written
decisions.278 If truth be told, local circuit rules precluding citation of
“unpublished opinions” are an anachronism. If ever the federal circuits
in fact issued bona fide “unpublished opinions,” they no longer do so as a
279
matter of law in 2005.

273

E.g., Arnold, supra note 122, at 219-20. “All opinions are public, in the sense that
they are available to the public. Anyone may walk in off the street, pay the appropriate
fee, and get a copy of any opinion or order of a court of appeals.” Id. at 220.
274
“What is most remarkable about the current regime is not that unpublished
opinions are not treated as binding precedent, but that later panels can treat them as
though they never existed.” Unpublished Judicial Opinions, supra note 60, at 49
(prepared statement of Arthur D. Hellman).
275
See supra notes 216-27 and accompanying text.
276
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(2) (2002).
277
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2002).
278
See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2072 (2005).
279
See id.
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If the Judicial Conference fails to adopt proposed Rule 32.1 or
something comparable within a reasonable time, the United States
Supreme Court should exercise its statutory power280 to adopt a uniform
rule applicable to all federal circuits. If the Supreme Court fails to act,
281
Congress should enact legislation
compelling the federal courts at
minimum to permit citation of unpublished opinions, subject to each
circuit court’s decision regarding the persuasive or precedential weight
the unpublished opinion warrants in deciding the pending case.282
XI. CONCLUSION
The conflicting local rules of the federal circuits regarding the
citation of unpublished decisions raise puzzling questions about whether
federal courts of appeals have a right to prevent attorneys and litigants
from referencing opinions that the courts have no practical ability to keep
out of the public eye. Moreover, with the lapse of time, together with
dramatic innovations in communication technology, the practice of
283
issuing “unpublished” opinions has become an anachronism – a legal
280

Id.

281

See 28 U.S.C.A. § 2072(a), (b) (2005).
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of
practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States
district courts (including proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and
courts of appeals.
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All
laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after
such rules have taken effect.

Congress has the authority to reject, modify, or defer any rules prescribed by the
federal judiciary. See Legislation Affecting the Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure,
108th Congress (Dec. 1, 2004) available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/
legislation108.pdf, at 1 n.1 (last visited Feb. 27, 2005). For example, H.R. 700,
introduced on February 11, 2003 by Representative Paul, would add a new Rule 49 to the
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rule 49(a) would require courts of appeals to issue
written opinions in certain categories of cases, including diversity cases in which the
amount in controversy exceeds $ 100,000. Rule 49(b) would permit any party to a direct
appeal to request issuance of a written opinion. See id. at 15; see also Pearson, supra note
22, at 1294-95. “The coverage of this proposal [H.R. 700] is peculiar, but its provisions
reflect both an understanding of the importance of opinions in a system of precedent and
a desire for openness and accountability in the federal courts.” Id. See generally Sloan,
supra note 24, at 734-38 (discussing congressional authority to regulate federal court
procedure).
282
See Sloan, supra note 24, at 766. “The courts’ unwillingness to change the practice
[of issuing non-precedential opinions] . . . makes a national rule or procedural statute an
appropriate vehicle for addressing the issue. Whether this will happen remains to be seen.
If it does, the Constitution will not stand in the way.” Id.
283
Even Judge Kozinski concedes the point:
[T]he term “unpublished” is an anachronism, dating back to the days
when failing to designate a disposition for inclusion in a national reporter
meant that it would not be published at all, and therefore unavailable to most
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fiction that has long outlived the rationale that may have originally
justified it. The grand “nonpublication” experiment the Judicial
Conference devised thirty years ago has not accomplished its purpose of
stemming the workload of the circuit courts. If anything, the empirical
data suggests the opposite.
It is time for the Judicial Conference to acknowledge that
technological developments have undermined the reasoning that at one
time arguably legitimized no-citation rules. Congress has spoken loudly
and clearly by enacting the E-Government Act of 2002, which renders
moot the outmoded nonpublication plans first adopted by the federal
circuits in the 1970s. The Judicial Conference has proposed adoption of
new appellate rules in direct response to the Act and its recent
284
amendments.
In doing so, the federal judiciary has tacitly conceded
Congress’s constitutional power to mandate public access to judicial
opinions, no matter how they may be classified by the issuing courts.
The Judicial Conference must accept its statutory responsibility to
set things right. If the Judicial Conference fails to act, the United States
Supreme Court should exercise its plenary power, conferred by
Congress, to unilaterally adopt uniform rules permitting citation of all
285
circuit court opinions, regardless of how local rules may classify them.
If the Supreme Court refuses to act within a reasonable period of time,
Congress ultimately has the constitutional power to step into the void.286
If it must, Congress can and should craft a statutory solution to a

members of the bar. Even at that time, unpublished did not mean secret.
Like all court records, unpublished dispositions are available to the parties
and the public from the clerk of the court. Today, of course, all dispositive
rulings, whether designated for inclusion in an official reporter or not, are
widely available online through Westlaw and Lexis, as well as in hard copy
in West’s Federal Appendix.
Unpublished Judicial Opinions, supra note 60, at 11-12 (prepared statement of Alex
Kozinski).
284
See Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure to the Chief Justice of the United States and Members of the Judicial
Conference of the United States 34 (September 2004), available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/rules/jc09-2004/JCReport.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005). “Under
section 205(c) of the E-Government Act of 2002 (Pub. Law No. 107-347), the Supreme
Court is to prescribe rules in accordance with the Rules Enabling Act governing the
privacy and security concerns arising from public access to electronic case files.” Id.
285
See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
286
“[T]he exercise of the inherent power of lower federal courts can be limited by
statute and rule, for ‘[t]hese courts were created by act of Congress.’” Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 47 (1991) (quoting Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.)
505, 511 (1874)); see Sloan, supra note 24, at 766.
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complex problem that the Judicial Conference unilaterally created287 but
apparently lacks the gumption to correct.
In the final analysis, the dire predictions advanced by opponents of
a uniform federal rule are simply unpersuasive. Further, to continue to
insist on maintaining different citation rules for “published” as opposed
to “unpublished” dispositions fails to acknowledge that as a practical
matter, the federal circuits have never controlled the public dissemination
of their decisions. Since their establishment in the late nineteenth
century, federal courts of appeals have always been subject to pressure
from West Publishing Company, which until recently held a virtual
monopoly on the for-profit publication of federal circuit court decisions.
Although the issuing panel, or sometimes the authoring judge,
decides in each instance whether an opinion should be “designated for
publication,” until recently, the commercial publishers have controlled
288
public access, not the courts.
One dramatic illustration is the initiation
287

Unpublished Judicial Opinions, supra note 60, at 7 (prepared statement of Samuel
A. Alito, Jr.).
As part of its “unpublished-opinions” policy, the Judicial Conference has
deliberately promoted experimentation by giving the respective courts of
appeals local discretion in this area. Whether the benefits of uniform
procedures governing citation of opinions outweigh the flexibility of local
procedures is subject to no easy answer. The federal judiciary is actively
engaged in studying the experiences of the courts and all the implications
regarding the appropriate use of “unpublished” opinions.
Id.
Congress has never endorsed the federal circuit courts’ nonpublication and nocitation rules. Reynolds & Richman, supra note 44, at 1205 & n.185 (1978). Because the
Judicial Conference did not implement the scheme under the authority of the Rules
Enabling Act, Congress had no opportunity to accept, amend, or veto the “major change
in the operation of the circuit courts” created by the widespread adoption of limited
publication/no-citation rules. Id; see also Caron v. United States, 183 F. Supp. 2d 149,
158 n.7 (D. Mass. 2001) (Young, C.J.) (“[N]ationally uniform rules adopted pursuant to
the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-72, take precedence over any locally adopted
rule[.]”)
288
See Mills, supra note 6, at 440.
[I]n the decades preceding the age of digital information, the unpublished
opinion was a phenomenon of only minor significance within legal research.
By the end of the 19th century, the universe of published case law had
become a well-defined and orderly system, embodied in the handsome
editions that made up West Publishing Company’s National Reporter
System. West’s case reporters set a standard that was universally accepted.
Virtually all published legal writing, irrespective of publisher, was geared to
the West cites. Opinions falling outside this system were not only disfavored
by courts and judges, they were also, as a practical matter, by and large
inaccessible to researchers. The legal profession, aided and abetted by West,
kept tight control of the shape of the research universe.
Id.; see also Nichols, Jr., supra note 22.
West had the cause of limiting proliferation of opinions very much at heart
and the business reasons for this were and are obvious. The bloating of the
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in 2001 of a new West reporter, the Federal Appendix, which publishes
bound volumes of federal circuit court opinions that have not been
“designated for publication” by the issuing panels. The fact that this new
reporter service followed Anastasoff by only a few months is likely not a
mere coincidence. For a major publisher to commit the resources to
establish a new reporter service to publish “unpublished” circuit
decisions is strong evidence that the legal community values access to
those decisions, whether or not they may be cited for their persuasive or
289
precedential value.
For the federal appellate courts to continue to assume that they
control public access by designating only a small minority of their
opinions for “publication” is simply unrealistic. As a practical matter, all
vestiges of any distinction between opinions “designated for publication”
and those that are not, at least in terms of public access, are gone forever.
All decisions issued by federal courts of appeals, whether “designated for
publication” or not, are more readily accessible to the practicing bar and
litigants now than ever before. In fact, all written decisions issued by
federal appellate courts have always been accessible to the public to a
greater or lesser degree, and all should be citable to the very court that
issued those decisions.290
The issue addressed by this article is whether a federal appellate
court may preclude an attorney from simply citing an unpublished
opinion to a panel of the same tribunal, for whatever weight the panel
may deem it worthy. Why a litigant may ethically cite a Shakespearean
sonnet,291 a nursery rhyme292 or even a fairy tale293 to a circuit panel, but
current volumes of Federal Reporter and their rabbit-like multiplication on
library shelves are, in fact, a menace to the market for the Federal Reporter.
To complete the picture, however, it is only fair to say that West revealed a
special antipathy towards opinions dealing with subject matters West felt
were not of interest to the majority of its customers . . . .
Id. at 912-13; see Philip Nichols, Jr., Selective Publication of Opinions: One Judge’s
View, 35 AM U.L. REV. 909 (1986); see Pether, supra note 21, at 1532 (noting the
“problems posed for judicial ethics by the effective entrusting of the publication of the
law of the land to duopolized commercial interests”).
289
Report of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
to the Chief Justice of the United States and Members of the Judicial Conference of the
United States 12 (September 2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/jc092004/JCReport.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005). “It is more likely that the publication of
all “unpublished” opinions by West and other publishers plays a greater role in a judge’s
decision to spend more time on drafting an opinion than the possibility that it might be
cited.” Id.
290
This article does not address the controversial issue whether a particular federal
court may constitutionally designate certain of its own opinions as “nonprecedential.”
291
“[T]he relationship between an employer and an employee, characterized by
reciprocal obligations and duties, is, like them, subject to time’s ‘wrackful siege of
battering days.’” Carlton v. Mystic Transp., Inc., 202 F.3d 129, 132 (2d Cir. 2000)
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not a written decision issued by another panel of the same court, is an
irony that simply defies rational explanation.294
(quoting William Shakespeare, Sonnet LXV, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE (W.J. Craig ed. 1928)); see also County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 866
F.2d 839 (6th Cir. 1989), which quoted from Shakespeare in a dispute over fees charged
for sewage disposal, including sludge-hauling:
Given the nature of their crimes and the element in which these dabblers in
sludge and scum worked, Shakespeare could almost have been speaking for
the convicted defendants when he wrote, in Sonnet CXI, “O, for my sake do
you with Fortune chide, The guilty goddess of my harmful deeds, That did
not better for my life provide, Than public means, which public manners
breeds. Thence comes it that my name receives a brand; And almost thence
my nature is subdu’d To what it works in, like the dyer’s hand . . . .”
Id. at 843 n.3 (quoting Shakespeare).
292
“Like Humpty Dumpty, a jury verdict once broken is difficult to put together
again.” Fabri v. United Techs. Int’l, Inc., 387 F.3d 109, 116 (2d Cir. 2004). In an
employment discrimination case alleging that the plaintiff’s superiors directed “epithets
and demeaning invective” at him, the Second Circuit’s opinion began, “There is a nursery
rhyme that teaches ‘sticks and stones may break my bones, but names will never hurt
me.’” Mandell v. County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368, 373 (2d Cir. 2003).
293
Circuit judges have been known to cite well-known fairy tales. See Roberts v.
Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 334 F.3d 505, 513 (6th Cir. 2003) (Batchelder, J.,
concurring) (quoting Lewis Carroll, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 186 (Penguin Books
ed. 1998) (conversation between Alice and Humpty Dumpty)); see supra note 24
(quoting conversation).
294
“[L]awyers must be free to cite noncircuit-binding opinions when they consider
them persuasive, just as they are free to cite fiction, doggerel, beer commercials and
stand-up comics when they consider these ‘precedence-persuasive.’” Testimony of
William T. Hangley, Transcript of 2004 Advisory Committee Hearing, supra note 68, at
212; see also id. at 221 (“For a court to blind itself in advance to the persuasive power of
its own reasoning . . . makes no sense.”); id. at 222 (“Stated as an abstract proposition, a
rule that lawyers can’t cite judicial statements they consider persuasive or criticize the
ones they consider erroneous is just unthinkable.”); Letter from Judge Frank H.
Easterbrook, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, to Peter G. McCabe, Secretary,
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Feb. 13, 2004) (supporting proposed
FED. R. APP. P. 32.1), available at http://www.secretjustice.org/pdf_files/Comments/03AP-367.pdf (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
When the institution of unpublished opinions was created, these documents
were unavailable to most lawyers. Local rules forbade citation in order to
avoid the advantage that institutional litigants, such as the Department of
Justice, otherwise could obtain. Today they are published on Westlaw,
Lexis, and the Federal Appendix. Under recent legislation every circuit must
post them online in searchable form. The original justification for not citing
these documents no longer applies. Nor is it possible to justify a non-citation
rule by reference to the difficulty in handling the greater volume of
dispositions; computers build indexes on the fly and have made obsolete the
old key number system that had been swamped by too many opinions. It is
hard for courts to insist that lawyers pretend that a large body of decisions,
readily indexed and searched, does not exist. Lawyers can cite everything
from decisions of the Supreme Court to “revised and extended remarks”
inserted into the Congressional Record to op-ed pieces in local newspapers;
why should the “unpublished” judicial orders be the only matter off limits to
citation and argument? It implies that judges have something to hide.

2005]

LEGAL FICTION OF THE UNPUBLISHED KIND

97

In the final analysis, adoption of a federal rule permitting citation of
all opinions, whether or not deemed precedential by the issuing court’s
local rules, is simply the right thing to do. In the eloquent words of
Judge Edward R. Becker, United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit:
[T]he strongest reasons for the national rule are . . . our duty to
the bar and the public, our respect for the bar and the litigants,
responsibility, accountability, all of which [are] undergirded and
informed by what I view as the unreasonableness of saying to
lawyers that you can’t cite what we’ve written. In my view, Rule
32.1, for these reasons which go to the core of our professional
responsibility, they have a right, and that’s why I endorse the
rule.295

It could not have been said any better.

Id. at 1-2.
295
Testimony of Judge Edward R. Becker, Transcript of 2004 Advisory Committee
Hearing, supra note 68, at 246-47.
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